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THE LIVING COMMERCE CLAUSE: FEDERALISM IN
PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL THEORY AND THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE AFTER LOPEZ AND MORRISON
Eric R. Claeys*
"Living Constitution " ideas are most often associated with individual-rights
guarantees like equal protection and due process, but they were originally
developed in the early twentieth century to revolutionize the law of the structural
Constitution - including the Commerce Clause. In this Article, Professor Claeys
interprets Progressive political theory, which played a crucial role in legitimating
the expansion of the national government. As applied to federalism, Progressive
living-Constitution theory required that the Commerce Clause be interpreted as a
constitutional transmitter letting the national government regulate whatever the
American people deem to be a national problem. He suggests that this notion of the
"living Commerce Clause" played an important role in the development of
Commerce Clause constitutional doctrine during the New Deal, and that it informs
the hostility to recent narrow readings of the Commerce Clause like United States
v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison.
Professor Claeys then uses these living Commerce Clause ideas to critique
contemporary federalism case law and scholarship. At the level of doctrine, "living
Commerce Clause "principles provide a sharper and clearer way to criticize Lopez
and Morrison than the leading criticisms to date. At the level of interpretive theory,
living Constitution theory highlights the strengths and weaknesses of a great deal
of contemporary constitutional-law scholarship, which borrows from the
Progressives'understanding of a living Constitution more than it realizes. Finally,
at the level of politics, if one understands the influence of and problems with
Progressive living Commerce Clause ideas, one is better prepared to judge the
political character of government under the constitutional principle that the
national government may regulate whatever the American people deem to be a
national problem.
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University. Thanks to Richard Brumbaugh for
his editorial and research assistance. Thanks to Richard Epstein, Barry Cushman, Daniel
Hulsebosch, John Copeland Nagle, Derek Jinks, Tom West, and Philip Hamburger for their
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INTRODUCTION
The constitutional law of individual rights is usually exciting and inspiring, but
the law of the Commerce Clause, which empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce
... among the several States,"' is often dry and boring. Just consider the Supreme
Court's record on civil rights. In Brown v. Board of Education,2 the Court
announced in no uncertain terms that state segregation violated basic American
guarantees of individual rights: "We conclude that in the field of public education
the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."3  By contrast, under the
Commerce Clause, the Court upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on non-moral
grounds, namely "overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial
discrimination has had on commercial intercourse" - even though it recognized
that Congress enacted the Act to respond to "what it considers to be a moral
problem." The Court condemned racial discrimination as a fundamental violation
of individual rights, but it applauded Congress's response to that discrimination only
with the enthusiasm of a macroeconomist.
There are a few ways to explain this incongruity, but surely one factor relates
to "living Constitution" theory. Living Constitution theory plays a crucial role in
individual-rights law, but little or no role in federalism. Brown promised to be
momentous when Justice Burton objected during the first oral argument: "But the
Constitution is a living document that must be interpreted in relation to the facts of
the time in which it was interpreted." Commerce Clause case law lies at the other
extreme. In Wickard v. Filburn,6 the most influential Commerce Clause case ever
since the New Deal, Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court discouraged any
discussion of how the Clause relates to contemporary ideals, individual rights, or
good government. "[W]ith the wisdom, workability, or fairness, of [Congress's]
plan for regulation" under the Commerce Clause, he concluded, "we have nothing
to do."7
For better or worse, Commerce Clause case law is now experiencing serious
tensions because it has refused to confront the "wisdom, workability, or fairness"
of federal regulation for more than two generations. In the last decade, the Supreme
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 Id. at 495.
" Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964) (emphasis added).
5 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 573 (1975); see also Brown, 347 U.S. at
492 ("[W]e cannot turn back the clock to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was
adopted.... We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its
present place in American life.").
6 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
' Id. at 129.
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Court has invalidated two federal laws on the ground that they exceed Congress's
powers under the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court
held that the Commerce Clause does not cover a federal gun-free school-zone law,9
and in United States v. Morrison,'" the Court held the Clause does not cover a statute
federalizing the tort of sexual assault." The debate about these cases thus far has
been strangely disjointed. In Lopez, for instance, the dissenters' main legal criticism
centered on abstruse economic causation questions - whether gun violence near
local schools depresses the American economy. 2 But as the political, judicial, and
academic reactions to Lopez have suggested, the debate between the Lopez majority
and dissenters is primarilypolitical. Prominent United States Senators want to deny
nominees confirmation if they have the "wrong" views about federalism. 3 The
Lopez and Morrison dissenters treat these cases as judicial activism. 4 Meanwhile,
respected academics regard these decisions as the harbingers of a "constitutional
revolution" that threatens to "redraw the constitutional map as we have known it."
So what if we were to learn that, once upon a time, Commerce Clause argument
was political, and was connected to the reform ideas associated with "the living
Constitution"? In this Article, I propose to show that Commerce Clause legal
doctrine has been shaped by living Constitution theory much more than is currently
appreciated. It is my thesis that Lopez and Morrison have disturbed widely held but
long-forgotten assumptions about the Commerce Clause legal doctrine. There are
in fact two separate justifications for post-New Deal doctrine: a legal, process-
oriented, and value-neutral justification, and a political, living Constitution
justification. The two justifications complemented one another from the New Deal
until Lopez. Since Lopez, however, thesejustifications are no longer complementing
each other, and they may even be working at cross purposes.
On its surface, Commerce Clause doctrine - the "rational basis" test - seems
to focus on technical ideas about economics and institutional competence. Now that
we live in an interconnected industrial national economy, Congress is supposed to
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
9 Id. at 551 (invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994)).
0 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Id. at 601 (invalidating 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)).
2 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616-25, 631-44 app. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13 See Judicial Nomination and Confirmation Process: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 1 (2001)
[hereinafter Judicial Nomination and Confirmation Process] (statement of Sen. Charles E.
Schumer) (announcing that the Senate intended to probe "the significance of the Supreme
Court's recent federalism decisions for the judicial selection process").
"' See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 605-06 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), and reliance on "the notions of liberty and property characteristic of
laissez-faire economics").
"5 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the ConstitutionalRevolution, 87
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1052-53 (2001).
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be more competent than the federal courts at distinguishing between national
problems and local problems. Thus, the "rational basis" test instructs courts to defer
to federal regulations of interstate commerce whenever Congress has any rational
basis for believing that the activity covered by the law affects interstate business in
any way. 6
But at its core, the rational basis test symbolizes a political principle essential
to the New Deal administrative state. This is the idea that national problems deserve
national legislative solutions. This idea comes out not so much in the test's
justifications as in its results. The Supreme Court did not strike down a single
federal law under the Commerce Clause from 1937 to 1995. During that period, a
large segment of the legal and political communities grew comfortable with the
notion that the Commerce Clause gives Congress something close to a general-
welfare power. Lopez and Morrison are controversial because they highlight the
discrepancy between this political idea and the standard legal justifications for
rational basis review. By insisting that Congress does not have a general-welfare
power, these decisions have threatened an important commitment held in many
political circles.
Most lawyers understand and know how to work with rational basis legal
arguments. Few understand where the rational basis test comes from. Hardly any
know how or why it relates to the political principle that Congress should have a
general-welfare power. To fill that gap in our understanding, this Article shows how
the rational basis test developed as the end result of two generations of agitation by
Progressive and New Deal political reformers. This Article closely studies the
Progressive Era because it was the Progressives who first developed the theoretical
case for the claim that national problems deserve national solutions. To make this
case, they also invented what we now know as "living Constitution" theory. Living
Constitution theory now makes the'Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses 7
transmitters for evolving conceptions of equality and privacy. In Progressive
political and constitutional theory, the Commerce Clause served the same function
for the American people's opinions about their evolving general and national
interests. As the American people decided, as one people, that they wanted to
eradicate slavery, secession, and the excesses of industrial capitalism, the Commerce
Clause "grew" by leaps and bounds to give Congress the power to confront each of
these challenges.
The most surprising result of this story is that the rational basis test is in many
respects an accident, a second-best compromise. Progressive and New Deal
16 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.... ."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 1 ("[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
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politicians developed rational basis ideas about an interconnected economy, but they
relied much more heavily on "living Commerce Clause" ideas to agitate for a wide
range of national policies. But as appealing as these living Commerce Clause ideas
were to politicians, they were much more problematic than rational basis ideas to
constitutional lawyers. The idea of a living and evolving Commerce Clause comes
close to suggesting that Congress has a catch-all general-welfare power. That
suggestion runs against the basic structure of the Constitution, particularly Article
I, which limits congressional powers by enumerating them. The Supreme Court
repudiated living Commerce Clause ideas in the watershed New Deal cases, but
allowed most of President Roosevelt's agenda to go forward under rational basis
principles. We now follow and live under the rational basis test because it gives
Congress something close to a general-welfare power, without forcing judges to
confront the uncomfortable implications of that power.
This story of the rise and fall of the living Commerce Clause makes several
substantial contributions to constitutional law scholarship. First, at the simplest
level, it helps answer the question whether Lopez and Morrison have launched a
judicial counter-revolution. Mark Tushnet and other scholars have started a serious
academic discussion about whether Lopez and Morrison mark the start of a rollback
of the New Deal or the beginning of a constitutional "regime change" within Bruce
Ackerman's theory of "constitutional regimes" and "constitutional moments."'" The
simplest way to settle this debate is to view Lopez and Morrison in the context of the
political struggle over the scope of American federalism. Lopez and Morrison are
controversial, but not because they roll back the rational basis test or the New Deal.
A large segment of American politics operates on the assumption that Congress has
the power to legislate on whatever the American people deem to be a national
problem. For several generations, the rational basis test has allowed courts to
sanction that legislation without facing whether Congress's laws and their decisions
are erasing the division between national and state power presupposed in Article I.
Lopez and Morrison are controversial because they force this latent tension out into
the open.
Second, if, as I suggest, Lopez and Morrison mark the start of a new chapter in
the debate over the proper scope of Congress's regulatory powers, this Article gives
constitutional theorists new legal arguments to use in that debate. As already
explained, Commerce Clause doctrine has always been slightly out of place in
comparison with more "cutting edge" constitutional doctrines. The Supreme Court
applies "living Constitution" principles readily in individual-rights law, but it shifts
IS See Mark Tushnet, Foreword. The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of
Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 30 (1999) [hereinafter Tushnet, New
Constitutional Order]; Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and
Constitutional Theory, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 845 (1996) [hereinafter Tushnet, Living];
see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
2002)
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
to the technical, economic, and value-neutral terminology of the rational basis test
when it moves to the Commerce Clause.
If living Constitution theory is so well accepted elsewhere, why not throw out
the rational basis test and ground Commerce Clause interpretation in living
Constitution ideas? Why not criticize Lopez and Morrison on the ground that these
decisions are out of touch with the American people's evolving conceptions of
commerce and their collective national interests? Such a criticism would be
particularly powerful now. Living Constitution theory is much better accepted
today than it was during the Progressive Era, both in the case reports and in
contemporary constitutional theory. At the end of the day, I do not find such
arguments persuasive, but I do find them formidable, more so than the criticisms
leveled against Morrison and Lopez to date.
Finally, the rise and fall of the living Commerce Clause has some important
lessons to teach us about the relationship between constitutional law and politics.
When we think about our deepest constitutional commitments, we may think of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, but there are probably very few of us
who think of the Commerce Clause. Nevertheless, living Commerce Clause ideas
have an important influence on the character of American government today. Along
the same lines, modem constitutional interpretation theory borrows more heavily
on Progressive living Constitution theory than it realizes. Most ambitiously, Bruce
Ackerman's We the People series proposes that American constitutional law takes
its normative bearings from a series of "constitutional moments" that create new
constitutional "regime principles" ratified in watershed political crises like the New
Deal.' 9 Ackerman's theory and other such theories draw heavily from the legacy of
Progressive living Constitution ideas. If we understand the influence of and
problems with Progressive living Constitution theory, we may put ourselves in a
better position to judge both the merits of constitutional theories like Ackerman's
and the character of the national government we live under today.
The argument in this Article proceeds as follows. The first four parts of this
Article recount the development of Commerce Clause doctrine from 1900 to Lopez,
emphasizing along the way the features relating to the Progressives' vision of a
living Commerce Clause. Part I explains the key doctrinal and theoretical elements
of pre-1900 Commerce Clause case law. Part II explains the Progressives' theory
of federalism and shows how academics used it to critique nineteenth-century
Commerce Clause doctrine. Part II shows how living Commerce Clause ideas were
repudiated in key federal initiatives during the New Deal, and then how the rational
basis test emerged as a second-best substitute for these ideas. Part IV suggests that
living Commerce Clause ideas are resurfacing now in cases such as Lopez and
Morrison. Finally, Parts V through VII consider the implications of the rise and fall
of the living Commerce Clause for the ongoing debate over Lopez and Morrison.
19 See ACKERMAN, supra note 18, at 266-68.
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I. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY:
BEFORE THE LIVING COMMERCE CLAUSE
To understand how the Progressives sought to remodel the federal-state
landscape, one must first understand how that landscape looked to them. From the
Founding until at least 1920, the Commerce Clause referred to trade, transportation,
and communication that took place across state lines. In the 1824 case Gibbons v.
Ogden,2 ° Chief Justice John Marshall interpreted the terms of this Clause, which by
its terms confers on Congress power to regulate "Commerce... among the several
States,"'" to mark off three categories of economic regulation.2 2  "Interstate
commerce" excluded activities that were not "commerce:" the local productive
activities, like manufacture, agriculture, and the labor associated with them, that
create goods and services for trade. It also excluded "commerce" that was not
"interstate": the trade, transportation, and communications that stayed within a
state's borders. 3 Thus, Congress could not license or otherwise regulate in-state
lotteries, 24 but it could regulate and even bar the shipment of lottery tickets between
states. 25 These three categories would guide the case law for another century.
To establish these categories, Marshall applied what we would now call textual
and structural principles of interpretation. He thought his constructions of
"Commerce" and "among the several States" accorded with what he called "their
natural sense," assuming the Founders "to have intended what they said." 6 In
addition, Marshall was sensitive to the structural consequences of the principle of
enumerated powers. He recognized that the Necessary and Proper Clause (also
known as the Sweeping Clause) gives Congress power to "make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper" for the carrying out of its enumerated powers27 and that the
Supremacy Clause makes Congress supreme within the fields within which it is
empowered to act.2" But the Sweeping and Supremacy Clauses protected
20 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
22 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194-96 (interpreting "among the several States"); see also Richard
A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1394 (1987)
(discussing Marshall's interpretation).
23 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1892) (holding that a sugar
trust was involved in manufacturing and not interstate commerce); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-96 (1824) (holding that completely internal commerce is not covered
by the Commerce Clause); see also Richard A. Epstein, Fidelity Without Translation, 1
GREEN BAG 2d 21, 25 (1998).
24 See The License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 470-71 (1866).
25 See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 352-54 (1903).
26 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 188.
27 Id. at 187 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
28 Id. at 210 (discussing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
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Congress's powers only within the fields properly marked off for it by Article I of
the Constitution. Each enumeration of a legislative power in Article I, section 8, he
admonished, "presupposes something not enumerated."29  By vesting specific
legislative powers in Congress, Article I automatically reserves a remainder of
general legislative powers to the states.30
But these broad outlines of federal and state power were not self-executing. In
Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall began his opinion by emphasizing that in hard cases
the Commerce Clause would have to be construed as "an investment of power" by
the American people "for the general advantage," to be construed not only "by the
language of the instrument which confers them" but also "with the purposes for
which they were conferred."'', The Clause marked off the broad boundaries between
congressional and state regulation; it was the federal judiciary's job to develop
constitutional law doctrines that would maintain the substance of these boundaries. 2
Thus, courts often emphasized that "commerce among the states [was] not a
technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business.
33
To nineteenth century judges, this remark meant that courts should look at the
practical consequences of a federal law before determining whether it regulated
interstate trade as Gibbons allowed or local trade or production as Gibbons
prohibited.34
To give content to Gibbons' vision, federal courts thus developed a doctrinal
test to distinguish between laws that "directly" affected interstate commerce and
laws that affected it only "indirectly." The former were proper objects of federal
regulation; the latter proper objects of state regulation. This "effects" test first
surfaced in Gibbons, a preemption case, and early dormant Commerce Clause cases
following Gibbons,3 but the Court imported these distinctions into its positive
Commerce Clause cases after the Civil War when litigants first cited the clauses to
challenge federal enactments.36
To be sure, this effects test begged important questions. It was a fact-intensive
test; the Court observed that the "precise line" between indirect and direct effects
"can be drawn only as individual cases arise."37 But generally speaking, if a federal
law regulated a combination of interstate trade and one of the other two classes,
29 Id. at 195.
30 See id. at 197-98, 203 ("No direct general power over these objects is granted to
Congress; and, consequently, they remain subject to State legislation.").
3' Id. at 189.
32 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 22, at 1395-99.
31 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905).
31 See id.; Epstein, supra note 22, at 1397-98, 1403-05.
3' E.g., Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U.S. 99, 103 (1876); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195.
36 See Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in the Commerce Clause, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1089, 1116-26 (2000).
37 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935).
[Vol. 11:403
THE LivING COMMERCE CLAUSE
federal judges tried to determine whether its primary effect was to regulate the
former (in which case it was constitutional) or the latter (in which case part or all of
the law was unconstitutional). This test gave the Supreme Court a way to scrutinize
federal laws that regulated a mixture of intrastate and interstate activities. The Court
used these distinctions in its Sherman Act precedents, for instance, to distinguish
between monopolies over manufacture and monopolies over interstate commerce in
already-manufactured goods." The test also gave the Court a "sham transaction"
doctrine to apply when Congress enacted a law that in form regulated interstate trade
but in substance tried to control intrastate manufacturing conditions. Thus,
Congress could bar the interstate shipment of potentially dangerous foods,39 and it
could bar the interstate delivery of prostitutes,4" but it could not require local
manufactures to follow national child labor rules as a condition of selling in
interstate commerce. The Court determined that such a child labor law was
unconstitutional because its "natural and reasonable effect" was to target "matters
purely local," namely conditions of manufacture."'
Nevertheless, this "effects" test was abstract.42 The test held together because
most nineteenth-century federal judges subscribed to a shared set of political
opinions about federalism that explained what purposes the Commerce Clause was
supposed to further. Different cases emphasized different reasons, but one theme
came out clearly. Ironic though it may sound, the Commerce Clause was designed
to promote vigorous federal government, by limiting that government to its proper
fields. Gibbons extolled the "genius and character of the whole government"
because "its action is to be applied ... to those internal concerns which affect the
States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State."'43
It would be not only "unnecessary," said Marshall, but even "inconvenient" for the
federal government to exercise the latter powers, which "can be most
advantageously exercised by the States themselves." One widely cited dormant
Commerce Clause case, Kidd v. Pearson, was even more blunt: If the Commerce
38 Compare, e.g., Addyston Steel & Pipe Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)
(upholding the prosecution of an interstate cartel in metal piping), with United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (declaring unconstitutional the prosecution of a sugar-
manufacture monopoly); see also Cushman, supra note 36, at 1094-99; Epstein, supra note
22,at 1427-29, 1435-40.
'9 See Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1911) (holding that
confiscation under the Food and Drug Act of adulterated eggs sold in interstate commerce
was constitutional).
40 See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 321-23 (1913).
41 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275-77 (1918), overruled by United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). In Hammer, the Court relied not only on the Commerce
Clause but also on the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 277.
42 See Epstein, supra note 22, at 1433-34 (criticizing E.C. Knight for its abstractness).
43 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195.
44 Id. at 194, 203.
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Clause swept too far, "[t]he result would be ... that the duty would devolve on
Congress to regulate all of these [local] delicate, multiform, and vital interests -
interests which in their nature are, and must be, local in all the details of their
successful management."' 5 "[I]t would be difficult to imagine," the Kidd Court
warned, "[a] situation more paralyzing to the state governments, and more
provocative of conflicts between the general government and the States, and less
likely to have been what the framers of the constitution intended." '46
Kidd restated a principle of political economy that was considered sound enough
to have the status of a permanent truth and sensible enough to constitutionalize
against the whims of Congress and state legislatures. Different regulatory problems
might challenge the distinctions between national and local in different ways. But
by and large, local governments were more effective at addressing economic
problems that demanded attention to local details, and the people were more happy
and less jealous of government when the government regulating their lives, liberty,
and property was next door, not hundreds of miles away. These themes traced back
to The Federalist Papers.47 As one case explained while extending the Commerce
Clause to cover interstate telephone regulation, Commerce Clause powers were
comprehensive enough to "keep pace with the progress of the country, and adapt
themselves to the new developments of time and circumstances." '48 Such decisions
assumed that statutory laws could be adapted to help the Commerce Clause and the
permanent principles of politics it codified keep pace with technological progress.
They did not anticipate that the clause itself could be adapted to make the
Constitution keep pace with a radical new theory of political progress.
II. THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: THE LIVING COMMERCE CLAUSE EMERGES
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Commerce Clause became
embroiled in the political turmoil of the Progressive Era. This was a time of ferment
in politics. With the Civil War long over, the frontier closed, and the country
"5 Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21 (1888), cited in Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S.
232,257 (1921); accordHammer, 247 U.S. at 272-73; United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1, 14-15 (1895).
46 Kidd, 128 U.S. at 122; see also Cushman, supra note 36, at 1122-25 (discussing Kidd
and congressional regulation of local interests).
47 See, e.g., THE FEDERALISTNO. 17, at 119 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
Mentor 1999) (1961) ("It is a known fact in human nature that its affections are commonly
weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object."); THE FEDERALIST No. 45,
at 261 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor 1999) (1961) ("The powers reserved
to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the peoplc, and the internal order, improvement,
and prosperity of the State.").
48 Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1877).
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connected by a transcontinental railroad system, the country faced a new wave of
questions about whether and how to regulate its booming economy. As contentious
as Progressive politics were, this era was a time of even more radical ferment in
academia. States and private donors were founding a wave of new modem research
universities. These universities housed a new breed of academic, who defined and
studied new social-science disciplines profoundly influenced by Darwin's theory of
evolution.4 9
During this period, leading academics and public intellectuals developed a top-
to-bottom critique of nineteenth-century American politics and constitutional law.
This critique began from the premise that the United States operates under a "living
Constitution." According to this premise, the American people comprise an organic,
evolving whole. The Constitution's structure and its ends adapt to conform to
changing popular opinions about national goals and fundamental American rights.
Nineteenth-century constitutional law, including the law of the Commerce Clause,
had to be transformed because it did not recognize the realities of government under
a living Constitution.
A. Progress and the Living Constitution
Living Constitution theory begins and ends with the concept of "progress," the
source of all political obligations.5" Under this theory, the human experience is an
unceasing struggle between a people's liberty and their collective interests. 1 This
emphasis on change distinguished Progressive political theory from the political
thought that informed the original Constitution, which presupposed that the
Constitution anticipated and checked most of the permanent problems in modem
politics. For instance, according to Frank Goodnow, professor of constitutional law
at Columbia University and the founding president of the American Political
Science Association,52 because "[t]he basis of political society was later seen to be,
as it probably always was, historical development," adherence to "absolute political
41 See DAVID A. RiCCi, THE TRAGEDY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 29-56 (1984).
50 I am indebted to Charles Kesler and John Marini for their help in explaining
Progressive principles of history and politics. See, Charles R. Kesler, Woodrow Wilson and
the Statesmanship of Progress, in NATURALRIGHT AND POLITICALRIGHT: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF HARRY V. JAFFA 103 (Thomas B. Silver & Peter W. Schramm eds., 1984); JOHN MARINI,
THE POLITICS OF BUDGET CONTROL 39-48 (1992). For another insightful account of these
themes, see Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism andthe Rise of the
Notion ofthe "Living Constitution "in the Course ofAmerican-StatefBuilding, 11 STUD. AM.
POL. DEV. 191 (1997).
5' See WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM 47-49 (1913).
52 Dennis J. Mahoney, A Newer Science of Politics: The Federalist and American
Political Science in the Progressive Era, in SAVING THE REVOLUTION: THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 250, 252 (Charles R. Kesler ed., 1987).
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ideals... at all times and under all conditions is productive of harm rather than
good."" Previous American thinkers and statesmen often failed to grasp this truth,
claimed Goodnow, "prior to the formulation of the evolutionary theory of
development in the world of science. 54
Reconceived in evolutionary terms, then, political life is an adaptive process, in
which a people continuously redefines its collective interests better to secure the
conditions of its freedom. As explained by Woodrow Wilson while he was still
President of Princeton University and perhaps America's most preeminent professor
of government: "A constitutional government is one whose powers have been
adapted to the interests of its people and to the maintenance of individual liberty.""
Progress thus signifies a process of social adaptation corresponding to Darwin's
rules for biological adaptation - in Wilson's words, "development and
accommodation to environment."56 If a society does not adapt, develop, and
accommodate, it "stagnates,"'.. "decay[s],"58 or even dies.
Because living Constitution theory holds that politics is organic and changing,
it places great weight on citizens' shared moral beliefs. The members of a society
display their political faculties when they discern the particular problems of their
day and collectively adapt their shared political principles to solve those problems.59
As Wilson explained: "Every generation ... sets before itself some favorite object
which it pursues as the very substance of its liberty and happiness. The ideals of
liberty cannot be fixed from generation to generation; only.., the large image of
what it is. '"6 What Wilson said of liberty applies just as well to government and
politics generally.
The Progressives thus saw a problem in American federalism where their
predecessors thought there was none. In the Progressives' diagnosis, American
federalism had to be reorganized to make way for two new facets of the emerging
American political consciousness. First, citizens were gradually but perceptibly
transferring their political allegiances from the states to the federal government.
Progressives thought Americans were gradually relinquishing their identities as
members of forty-odd separate states to enter into a single national political
consciousness. As the American national identity became more tightly-knit and
mature, the federal government would replace the states in many areas as the
13 FRANK J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1911).
" Id.; see also Gillman, supra note 50, at 214-16.
15 WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONALGOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1908).
56 WILSON, supra note 51, at 45; see also Gillman, supra note 50, at 215-16; Charles R.
Kesler, Separation of Powers and the Administrative State, in THE IMPERIAL CONGRESS 20
(Gordon S. Jones & John A. Marini eds., 1988).
57 WILSON, supra note 55, at 29.
58 Id. at 196.
59 See WILSON, supra note 51, at 35, 47-48.
60 WILSON, supra note 55, at 4.
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immediate government for the people of America." .
Second, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the American people were
collectively demanding a new program of social reform to protect them from the
excesses of industrial capitalism. This reform program was the latest manifestation
of the people's progressive quest to attain a state of perfect collective liberty. In
Progressives' view, the original Constitution may have secured political freedoms
for the American people by guaranteeing individual rights against the arbitrary
actions of a lawless king and oppressive parliament. But a century later, times had
changed. Political rights were not in jeopardy; economic rights were. Herbert
Croly, founder of the The New Republic and a leading advisor to Theodore
Roosevelt, explained in The Promise of American Life that by 1909, "the
discontented poor are beginning to charge their poverty to an unjust political and
economic organization, and reforming agitators do not hesitate to support them in
this contention." '62
B. The Commerce Clause in the Living Constitution
To carry out this program of social reform, Progressive theorists developed a
thoroughgoing critique of the American constitutional order. In their diagnosis, the
Constitution as originally drafted failed to live up to the necessities that a living
Constitution must meet in a world shaped by progress and adaptation. To Croly, the
American nation was a "living formative political principle."'63 To Woodrow
Wilson, the Constitution was "not a mere lawyers' document: it is a vehicle of life,
and its spirit is always the spirit of the age." As a vehicle of life, the Constitution
had to be read as a vehicle for social and political change. As the will of the
American people changes, claimed Wilson, there will be "normal and legitimate
alterations of... constitutional understanding'6S because "governments have their
natural evolution and are one thing in one age, another in another."'66
Living Constitution theory served as a blueprint not only for political reform but
also for a new theory for constitutional interpretation. Frank Goodnow wrote his
treatise Social Reform and the Constitution to propose a new theory watering down
ordinary rules of stare decisis as applied to constitutional law.67 He did so to
establish as a "rule that constitutions, which are practically unamendable, should be
... so interpreted by judicial decision as to be susceptible of a continuous and
61 See WILSON, supra note 55, at 46-49; HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF THE
AMERICAN LIFE 265-88 (N.E. Univ. Press, 1989) (1909); GOODNOW, supra note 53, at 6-.15.
62 CROLY, supra note 61, at 20.
63 Id. at 272.
64 WILSON, supra note 55, at 69.
65 Id. at 50.
66 Id. at 54; see also Gillman, supra note 50, at 217-18.
67 See GOODNOW, supra note 53, at 5.
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uninterrupted development. ' 8
Within a living Constitution interpretation, the Commerce Clause serves as the
organ in the living Constitution that transmits the people's growing conception of
national identity to the national government. Woodrow Wilson, like others,
recognized that, at the Founding, "strictly speaking," only "[t]he actual interchange
of goods ... is commerce, within the narrow and specific meaning of the term." '69
But that original meaning was no longer relevant to the country's political
conditions by 1908: "[T]he subject-matter of that definition is constantly changing,
for it is the life of the nation itself"7" Goodnow agreed. He read the Commerce
Clause as "[t]he great exception to the rule that the powers granted to the federal
government were rather special than general in character."7 "It is the one clause in
the constitution," he predicted, "which lends itself most readily as a means for the
reconstitution of our political system in accordance with changing economic
needs.""2
C. Changed Circumstances and Federal Economic Regulation
Because the Progressives did not tie the meaning of the Commerce Clause down
to any fixed ideas about trade or state lines, they had to breathe new meaning into
the clause by divining what "interstate commerce" meant to the American people
in their day. Generally, they held, interstate commerce encompassed those fields
covered by the growing American national identity. Woodrow Wilson observed:
"The federal government has only the regulation of those matters in which there is
manifestly and of necessity a common interest."73 Because the American people had
formed a common interest in the economic turmoils of their time, economic issues
were now ripe for general federal regulation.
The Progressives acknowledged that the Commerce Clause had been drafted
narrowly, but thought the Founders would have wanted a more expansive
Commerce Clause if they thought the states would have ratified one. Wilson did not
even acknowledge the principles of political economy and federalism that informed
The Federalist Papers and decisions like Gibbons and Kidd. Instead, Wilson simply
thought the Founders had no "reasons of theory" for so limiting the scope of federal
powers, only expedient "reasons of fact."'74 Originally, the states' "comparative
geographical isolation, and their difference in economic and social conditions,"
explained Frank Goodnow, "naturally had the effect of causing the states, as these
68 Id. at 6.
69 WILSON, supra note 55, at 185.
'o Id. at 173.
7' GooDNow, supra note 53, at 35.
2 Id. at 36.
73 WILSON, supra note 55, at 41.
14 Id. at 44.
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communities came to be called, to regard the maintenance of a large degree of local
independence as of the greatest importance., 75 Thus, Wilson concluded, the
Founders would have created a plenary national government if they could have,76
but they were frustrated by "the jealous politicians of the self-conscious little
commonwealths" that were the original thirteen states.77
Thus, while the Commerce Clause was originally designed for the political
purpose of fighting state protectionism, 7 the Progressives' challenge was to
reinterpret the Clause "by the exigencies and the new aspects of life itself."79 The
constitutional trick was to determine precisely how times had changed and how the
Commerce Clause had grown to cover interests more encompassing than
antiprotectionism. Wilson, like others, began by establishing that "radical changes
since 1787 . . . operated to draw the nation together, to give it the common
consciousness ... which will eventually impart to it in many more respects the
character of a single community."8 "The gradual spread of the English language,"
Goodnow noted, "has brought about a complete unity in speech."8' Wilson
observed that before Daniel Webster's oration in the Webster-Hayne Debate, "[t]he
nation lay as it were unconscious of its unity and purpose, and he called it into full
consciousness." 2 The slavery question, the secession question, and the Civil War
"more than any other called the nation to consciousness and to action."83 When the
frontier closed in 1890, these Progressive "processes which knit close and unite all
fibres into one cloth [were] now everywhere visible to anyone who [would] look
beneath the surface. 8 4
At the dawn of the twentieth century, having overcome these geographic and
political challenges to its identity, the United States was ready to face the next
challenge - in Woodrow Wilson's words, "first or last, the whole economic
movement of the age."85 In response to this movement, the Progressives generally
agreed that the Industrial Revolution had blurred the lines between local and
national economic regulation. As Herbert Croly described it: "[T]he increased
efficiency of organization in business and politics, the enormous growth of an
75 GOODNOW, supra note 53, at 9.
76 The makers of the Constitution had "from the first looked forward to" the hope that
"we shall consciously become a single community." WILSON, supra note 55, at 51. A great
deal of modem historical scholarship on the Founding borrows on this theme. See, e.g.,
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787 (1972).
71 WILSON, supra note 55, at 45.
78 In Wilson's words, "the warfare of selfish commercial regulation." Id. at 185.
71 Id. at 192.
80 Id. at 46.
1 GOODNOW, supra note 53, at 10.
82 WILSON, supra note 55, at 49.
83 Id. at 48.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 178.
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irresponsible individual money-power, the much more definite division of the
American people into possibly antagonistic classes.. . these new conditions and
demands have been by way of upsetting once more the traditional national
balance."86
In these circumstances the Progressives concluded, like Croly, that the
Constitution "will have to dispense with the distinction between state and interstate
commerce."87 If not, Croly warned, the Commerce Clause would frustrate "the
exercise of any really effective responsibility and power by the central
government."88 Frank Goodnow agreed, advising that "political centralization is
necessary if political systems are to be in accord with recognized economic facts."89
It was unfortunate, he commented, that nineteenth-century states' rights ideas
"resulted in a constitutional tradition which is apt not to accord to the federal
government powers it unquestionably ought to have the constitutional right to
exercise."9 °
D. States' Rights
As Croly, Goodnow, and Wilson's remarks make clear, the Progressives clearly
wanted to erase the line between interstate commerce and intrastate commerce. But
what about the line between these two classes of activities and the local activities
that produced goods and services for commerce? And what about criminal law,
family law, and the many other areas of local law that, while not regulating
"economic" matters per se, still mold citizens into industrious and productive
members of the society in which they live? These questions did not arise during the
Progressive Era, but they were the focus of attention during the New Deal. Now
they are the objects of urgent consideration after Lopez and Morrison.
Progressive thought had two separate answers to this question - one immediate
and incremental, another theoretical and radical. Both deserve serious examination,
because both inform political and legal thought now. Progressivism's basic
theoretical stance toward federalism has a great deal of influence in modem
liberalism, both in politics and constitutional law. But Progressive ideas could also
be used to make a "states' rights" critique of the modem liberal project. Such a
critique has taken hold in modem conservatism, crowding out the federalist
principles of The Federalist Papers and cases like Gibbons and Kidd in the process.
Thus, not only did the Progressives found a new and successful political movement,
they also founded a new opposition to that movement. They helped erase the
86 CROLY, supra'note 61, at 269.
87 Id. at 357.
88 Id. at 351.
89 GOODNOW, supra note 53, at 7.
90 Id. at 11.
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Founders' political vocabulary for federalism, which might have provided a stronger
critique of their project.9 In this respect the Progressives enjoyed the same devious
and spectacular success that Jean-Jacques Rousseau enjoyed in continental Europe.
Rousseau's liberal students used his principles to launch the French Revolution,
while his conservative students propounded romanticism, nationalism, and
historicism to resuscitate throne-and-altar conservatism after that revolution.92 In
both cases, the opponents of the new order failed to appreciate the extent to which
they were fighting the new order according to new terms established by the
architects of the new order.
Modem American conservatism builds on the states' rights tendencies in
Progressivism, which were incremental and conservative in comparison with the
expansion of federal regulation that would occur later during the New Deal. While
the Progressives wanted to eliminate the lines between interstate and intrastate
commerce, they expected the federal-state system to remain otherwise intact.
Woodrow Wilson expressed some of these reservations. He acknowledged that "the
states are our great and permanent contribution to constitutional development.
9 3
Herbert Croly warned of the disruptions of too-violent centralization: "Such as it
is," he warned, "the American people are attached to [their] national tradition; and
no part of it could be suddenly or violently transformed or mutilated without
wounding large and important classes among the American people."94 On that basis,
he called "the abolition of American local political institutions" absurd.95 Wilson
felt strongly about this point because he believed that the states played two crucial
roles in politics. They furnished the country with "an ideal means of integrating a
vast and various population, adapting law to changing and temporary conditions." '96
In addition, Wilson believed, states molded their citizens' mores as the federal
government never could. When state communities "sprung up of themselves,
irrepressible, a sturdy, spontaneous product of the nature of men nurtured in a free
air," they gave the American constitutional order an "extraordinary elasticity.' '97
That elasticity made "our political system so admirable an instrument of vital
constitutional understandings." '
Consequently, while Progressives argued for an expansion of federal power,
they wanted to reserve to the states areas of law that formed character or required
9' See supra note 43-47 and accompanying text. Howard Gillman has made the same
point generally. See Gillman, supra note 50, at 241-44.
92 See Allan D. Bloom, Rousseau - The Turning Point, in CONFRONTING THE
CONSTITUTION 211, 212-14 (Allan D. Bloom ed., 1990).
93 WILSON, supra note 55, at 50.
'4 CROLY, supra note 61, at 268.
15 Id. at 272-77.
96 WILSON, supra note 55, at 50.
I d. at 182-83.
98 Id.
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experimentation. Wilson, for one, believed "all the ordinary legal choices that shape
a people's life," including family law ("the regulation of domestic relations"), labor
law ("and of the relations between employer and employe[e]"), and criminal-law
enforcement, were better left to the states.9 Above all, states should continue to
keep control over "[m]oral and social questions originally left to the several
States."'00
E. General Federal Power
Because the Progressives' thought had this "states' rights" streak, they have
been criticized by many liberals in many quarters. For instance, after canvassing the
conservative tendencies in Wilson's thought, Eldon Eisenach criticizes Wilson's
program for federalism as "reactionary" and suggests that it "fl[ies] in the face of
more than two decades of economic teaching in America exposing the moral
bankruptcy and intellectual absurdity of laissez faire."'' Eisenach thus laments that
"[n]o serious reform could be urged within the prevailing system of party and
constitution, both of which Wilson so vigorously defended."'0 2
Eisenach is dissatisfied with Wilson because he did not push hard and fast
enough for what later became the New Deal. Nevertheless, Eisenach drastically
underestimates how much Wilson and his compatriots contributed to the New Deal,
by articulating the theoretical critique that led to the New Deal. The New Dealers
established a new constitutional and political system for America. But their
accomplishments would not have been possible if Wilson and his contemporaries
had not gutted the theoretical foundations of the old system and laid a new
foundation on which the New Dealers could build.
The main thrust of Progressive thought about federalism and nationalism was
as radical as any New Dealer could want. On living Constitution premises, the
Commerce Clause vests in Congress power to regulate any and every problem that
occupies the interests and attention of the American people's political
consciousness. Because this consciousness is the source of all authority in a living
Constitution system, it justifies using national legislative power to tackle any
national problem. Living Constitution theory reaches this far because it makes the
American people's "will," its historical political consciousness, the foundation for
political and constitutional authority. Under the Commerce Clause, Woodrow
Wilson explained, "[t]he federal government has only the regulation of those matters
in which there is manifestly and of necessity a common interest. ' '
9' WILSON, supra note 55, at 183.
'00 Id. at 195.
' ELDON J. EISENACH, THE LOST PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM 125 (1994).
102 Id. at 126.
'03 WILSON, supra note 55, at 41.
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These interests emanate from the American people's collective faculty for
making political judgments, which Wilson called the American people's "common
political consciousness."'10 4 Before the people can give historical direction to their
politics, they must enter into a state of close social identity. In Wilson's
explanation, the people must have "a distinct consciousness of common ties and
interests, a common manner and standard of life and conduct, and a practised [sic]
habit of union and concerted action in whatever affect[s] it as a whole."'' 5 This
commonality creates a powerful antithesis between the people's collective
consciousness and their individual attachments to private interests. The idea is
Hegelian: As animals show that they are animate when they overcome gravity to
move, humans show that they are human when they overcome their individualistic
and self-regarding animal passions to form a society, uniform modes of behavior,
and above all common political opinions."°6 "Every man in a free country is, as it
were, put upon his honor," Wilson explains, "to be the kind of man such a polity
supposes its citizens to be: a man with his thought upon the general welfare, his
interest consciously linked with the interests of his fellow-citizens."'0 7  If the
individual members of the community do not sacrifice their selfish interests, they
will be "inorganic, unthoughtful, without concert of action," suffering from "[t]he
lethargy of an unawakened consciousness [and] the helplessness of unformed
purpose."'
0 8
Because this consciousness determines which ends the country should pursue
and how it should pursue them, it is the supreme authority in American politics. But
because it makes the American people the supreme judge of what is of national
interest or local interest, it builds huge prejudices against state and local regulation
104 Id. at 26.
105 id.
106 See GEORGE WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 15 (J. Sibree
trans., 1956). This antithesis is a central feature of Continental political thought. The
antithesis was presented most powerfully and memorably in the writings of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A Discourse on a Subject Proposed by the
Academy ofDijon: What Is the Origin of Inequality Among Men, and Is It Authorized by
Natural Law?, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT ANDDISCOURSES 31, 59-60 (G.D.H. Cole trans.,
1993) (insisting that man displays "spirituality of soul" by his "consciousness of [his]
liberty" to perfect himself); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT AND THE DISCOURSES, supra, at 179, 191-92 (proposing that man free himself
by alienating all of his individual interests to the community to take part in the community's
"unity, its common identity, its life, and its will"). Wilson incorporates this feature of
Rousseau's thought because his theory ofProgress follows Hegel's theory of History. In the
well-formed state, Hegel claims, "the private interest of [the state's] citizens is one with the
common interest ofthe state; when the one finds its gratification and realization of the other."
HEGEL, supra, at 21.
107 WILSON, supra note 55, at 23.
"'8 Id. at 25.
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into Progressive-style politics and constitutional interpretation. Progressive political
theory starts from the assumption that historical forces are always acting to move
the American people into an ever-closer national identity. Americans were separate
and atomized "peoples" of several states at the Founding, but they have "grown" as
they have enlarged the scope of their common interests and their common
consciousness. Federal legislation is the sign of a healthy, "progressive" political
order because Congress is presumably responding to an integrated and vibrant
American will. Herbert Croly could thus confidently assert that "the Federal
government belongs to the American people even more completely than do the state
governments, because a general current of public opinion can act much more
effectively on the single Federal authority than it can upon the many separate state
authorities."'' 9
Given how Progressives envisioned this national consciousness, it was probably
inevitable that the nationalizing tendencies in their thought would swamp the states'
rights tendencies. State authorities, by contrast, seem not progressive, but
reactionary in comparison to this national will. Local legislation, by its very
existence, competes against and undermines the conditions from which a national
will can come into being. Woodrow Wilson claimed that the mere fact that there is
a "conflict of laws" between states creates problems "in matters which vitally
interest the whole country."' " "[N]o State or region can wisely stand apart to serve
any peculiar interest of its own," he warned, and the states' tendency to do so in his
time "constitutes the greatest political danger of our day.'' . Along the same lines,
Croly concluded that state governments were simply "not competent to deal
effectively in the national interest and spirit with the grave problems created by the
aggrandizement of corporate and individual wealth."
' 12
However conservative they regarded the changes they were proposing," 3 the
theory the Progressives cited to demand these changes could easily be used to justify
any expansion of the scope of the national government. Thus, Frank Goodnow
could claim that constitutional arrangements should be brought "into accord with
existing facts rather than with some absolute political theory" whenever "the actual
economic and social situation" dictates such a result." 4 Croly rejected contemporary
Commerce Clause doctrine, stating: "The distinction between domestic and inter-
state commerce which is implied by the Constitutional distribution of powers is a
distinction of insignificant economic or industrial importance; and its necessary
legal enforcement makes the carrying out of an efficient national industrial policy
1 CROLY, supra note 61, at 278.
"1 WILSON, supra note 55, at 186.
"' Id.
112 CROLY, supra note 61, at 275.
113 See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 55, at 194 ("Change as well as stability may be
conservative.").
" GOODNOW, supra note 53, at 11.
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almost impossible.""' 5 Even Wilson, the supposed "reactionary," described the
Commerce Clause in sweeping terms:
Actual alterations of interest in the make-up of our national life, actual,
unmistakable changes in our national consciousness, actual modifications
in our national activities such as give a new aspect and significance to the
well-known purposes of our fundamental law, should ... be taken up
into decisions which add to the number of things of which the national
government must take cognizance and attempt to control. " 6
Whenever the American people think a problem is a national problem, it
automatically demands a national legislative solution.
F. Judicial Deference to Congressional Nationalism
Once this political commitment to a national will was firmly in place,
Progressive political theory also began to speak about the roles each of the branches
should play in interpreting the Commerce Clause. The federal judiciary had two
roles. One was to make sure that an expanding federal government did not interfere
with individual rights. "' The other and prior responsibility was to conform the
country's organic law to the people's developing and adapting will. In Wilson's
view, courts were supposed to bring about "a slowly progressive modification and
transfer of functions as between the States and the federal government along the
lines of . . . that national consciousness which is the breath of all true
amendment."",18
But what if the courts should refuse to go along with this process of historical
growth, to adapt the constitutional case law to the times? In that unfortunate
scenario, the other branches of government would have to put the courts in their
place. Frank Goodnow considered it an essential part of his project to "consider
what methods there are by which pressure may be brought to bear upon the courts
to induce them either to abandon or not to adopt the conception that our
constitutions postulate a fixed and unchangeable political system.'' Because
". CROLY, supra note 61, at 351.
116 WILSON, supra note 55, at 194-95.
"'7 See, e.g., id. at 143 ("[The judiciary] is meant to maintain that nice adjustment between
individual rights and governmental powers which constitutes political liberty.").
" Id. at 194; see also id. at 170 (arguing "the courts have rightly endeavored to make the
Constitution a suitable instrument of the national life, extending to the things that are now
common the rules that it established for similar things that were common at the beginning.").
"9 GOODNOW, supra note 53, at 6; see also id. at 16 (arguing that "[w]hat we need more
than anything else.., is a consistent theory of constitutional interpretation, which will permit
of our orderly development as a nation in accordance with our economic and social needs,
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political and social norms change, claimed Wilson, each federal officer has
constitutional power corresponding to the extent to which he is "in most direct
communication with the nation itself."' 0 Because the courts have no direct contact
with the national will, in cases of conflict the courts must defer to the President and
Congress's expressed judgment about the scope of federal jurisdiction.
G. Commerce Clause Legal Doctrine During the Progressive Era
Although these ideas began to influence how intellectuals and policy-makers
viewed the various branches of the federal government, they did not take hold in the
law immediately. To be sure, cracks began to appear in the basic categories of
Commerce Clause regulation. Frank Goodnow concluded that the Supreme Court's
antitrust case law had eliminated the boundaries between monopolies over interstate
commerce and manufacture, 2 ' though it is probably fairer to say only that twenty
years' worth of cases had blurred the lines to some extent.'22 The line between
intrastate and interstate commerce also blurred as Congress regulated more and more
conditions of railroad transportation. In particular, The Shreveport Rate Cases2.
upheld the power of Congress and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to
regulate intra-state railroad rates to stop these runs from undermining ICC-
prescribed rates for inter-state railroad runs. 24
By and large, before the New Deal the Court's Commerce Clause case law kept
the broad distinctions between local production, in-state commerce, and interstate
commerce tolerably clear. As a 1921 case explained in dicta: "It is settled, e.g., that
the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce does not reach whatever is
essential thereto. Without agriculture, manufacture, mining, etc., commerce could
not exist but this fact does not suffice to subject them to the control of Congress."'2 5
Whatever academic scribblers were saying during the Progressive Era, the law
would not change its basic direction until the New Deal.
and is not confined within the political and legal conceptions of a century or more ago.").
120 WILSON, supra note 55, at 109.
121 See GOODNOW, supra note 53, at 80.
122 See Cushman, supra note 36, at 1094-99; Epstein, supra note 22, at 1432-42.
123 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
124 See id. at 354-55. That said, the Shreveport Rate Cases were not as exceptional to pre-
New Deal lawyers as they seemed during and after the New Deal. As Barry Cushman has
explained, to pre-New Deal lawyers, the Shreveport ruling applied only to common carriers,
a narrow class of businesses constitutionally subject to rate regulation. See Cushman, supra
note 36, at 1126-31; Epstein, supra note 22, at 1420-21.
125 Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 257 (1921).
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l. THE NEW DEAL: THE LIvING COMMERCE CLAUSE GOES UNDERGROUND
The New Deal inverted the basic orientation of Commerce Clause doctrine. As
of 1932, it was still possible to say that the Commerce Clause was one of several
limited and enumerated federal regulatory powers. A decade later it seemed fairer
to say that the Commerce Clause gave the federal government unlimited and general
powers.
Yet the Commerce Clause doctrine that came out of the New Deal was not quite
the doctrine that the most ardent New Dealers hoped for. In the early stages of the
New Deal, Progressive living Commerce Clause ideas left the academy, settled into
the U.S. Statutes at Large, and were then repudiated by a federal judiciary much
more conservative than the Roosevelt Administration and the New Deal Congress.
The most ardent New Dealers hoped to use the New Deal legislative agenda to
establish on principle that the American constitutional order was now run by a
federal government of general regulatory powers. After the constitutional crisis of
1935 to 1937 had ended, the New Dealers won most of their legislative agenda, but
not the principle. They could not win a legal mandate for the living Commerce
Clause; they had to settle instead for concrete legislative victories and the process-
oriented abstractions of the rational basis test. 26
A. The Rise and Fall of the Living Commerce Clause
As the previous Part explained, the Progressives' interpretation of the
Commerce Clause was simultaneously incremental and radical. The Progressives
supported decisions like the Shreveport Rate Cases, which gave the federal
government power to regulate intrastate railroad runs along with interstate railroad
travel. Many opposed using federal power to regulate local manufacture, some
opposed using it to regulate labor, and all disavowed using it to regulate domestic
issues like moral questions and family law. At the same time, the historicist theory
the Progressives developed to attack the line between intrastate and interstate
commerce was much more radical and far-reaching in its implications than the
incremental goals to which they applied it. Their vision of a living Commerce
Clause created a plausible and principled argument, in politics and in constitutional
law, for demanding national legislation to attack any issue regarded by the American
people as a national problem.
Progressive ideas had considerable impact during the New Deal, because most
of the ardent New Dealers cut their teeth on Progressive political and legal theory.
Frank Goodnow's work continued to command respect into the middle of the
126 For other accounts of this period, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION ANDTHE
NEW DEAL (2000); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEALCOURT: THE STRUCTURE
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 139-225 (1998).
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twentieth century. Woodrow Wilson's star waned later, but he was revered during
the New Deal. To many historians, he was "the president who played John the
Baptist for Franklin D. Roosevelt"'27 and sympathetic opinion makers transmitted
his idealism, his reform program, and his theory to students and readers for a
generation after his Presidency.'28
Most New Dealers probably agreed that the Commerce Clause needed to be
expanded one or two steps further than the Progressives had taken it. Even if the
Progressives had thought manufacture and labor should remain objects of local
concern and regulation, a generation later times and the public mood had changed.
The Great Depression showed that the entire American economy was
interconnected. More fundamentally, from a political standpoint, because the
Depression impressed upon the people that they sank or swam together in a huge
national economy, it made the American economy a new object of the American
national political consciousness.
While most New Dealers subscribed to Progressive principles about social
reform and government, different actors applied these principles differently. On one
hand, idealistic politicians and intellectuals hoped the New Deal would transform
American government to conform to the real principles of politics as laid out by the
Progressives. If politics were meant to facilitate social reform, and if constitutional
institutions like federalism and separation of powers stood in the way of reform
administered by vigorous national bureaucracies, better to admit candidly that these
institutions were obsolete, abandon them, and found a new constitutional order in
keeping with the true realities of historicist politics as discovered by Progressive
political scientists. On the other hand, pragmatic officials - and especially the
lawyers who had to defend the idealists' achievements in the courts - sympathized
with their fellow travelers, but they had reservations about attacking the
constitutional order head-on to achieve their ends.
This tension is evident in the Supreme Court's New Deal docket and some of
the leading historiography about the New Deal.'29 As Arthur Schlesinger has noted,
President Roosevelt's First New Deal, enacted in 1933, was drafted by
"characteristically social evangelists."' 30 Schlesinger said of one such lawyer that
127 ROBERT SOBEL, COOLIDGE: AN AMERICAN ENIGMA 194 (1998).
128 See also THOMAS SILVER, COOLIDGE ANDTHE HISTORIANS 152-54 (1982) (criticizing
progressive historians for characterizing early twentieth century politics too much in terms
of class struggle).
29 See, e.g., Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REv. 201,249-55
(1994) (discussing the contrast between sweeping rhetorical legal strokes and "exquisite
craftsmanship"). Cushman admires the lawyers more than the idealists because of their
craftsmanship, but a strong case can be made that the idealists were more admirable for their
candor and integrity in relation to their basic political commitments.
130 3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THEAGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL
393 (1960).
[Vol. 11:403
THE LfIvNG COMMERCE CLAUSE
he was "moved by a passionate feeling that the imperatives of history required
drastic social reorganization, wanted to draft laws and fight cases in terms of
prophetic affirmations [and] he resented the whole notion of pussy-footing around
to avoid offending the stupid prejudices of reactionary judges."''
Lawyers, politicians, and bureaucrats moved by the "imperatives of history" are
the kinds of officials who would be likely to interpret the Commerce Clause in
living Constitution terms, as a symbol of the nation's evolving general interests. In
all likelihood, they defined the broad political goals President Roosevelt's New Deal
set out to achieve, and, as Schlesinger points out, they played a huge role in drafting
the first New Deal.
By contrast, Roosevelt's Second New Deal, enacted in 1935, Schlesinger says,
was drafted "characteristically [by] lawyers, precise and trenchant." ' These
lawyers' lawyers were careful "always [to] show[] a meticulous regard for legal
continuities."' These are the lawyers who culled through the Supreme Court's pre-
1937 Commerce Clause case law to find the precedents that would make the New
Deal seem as un-revolutionary as possible. They may not have defined the New
Deal's basic political commitments, but they invented the legal formulas that would
help convert those commitments into a concrete record of legislative
accomplishments.
The lawyers' lawyers certainly had more success in the Supreme Court during
the New Deal. Living Constitution interpretations of the Commerce Clause failed
colossally in the Court during the critical years of the New Deal, while more narrow
interpretations convinced a Court majority to uphold President Roosevelt's agenda.
The centerpiece of President Roosevelt's first New Deal was the National Industrial
Recovery Act, which gave the President the power to establish fair-competition
codes for any industry of his choosing. The preamble to this Act declared that the
conditions of the Great Depression not only "burden[ed] interstate and foreign
commerce" but also "affect[ed] the public welfare, and undermine[d] the standards
of living of the American people."'3 The first declaration at least claimed to follow
pre-New Deal "effects" doctrine; the other two declarations claimed for Congress
a general-welfare regulatory power. A unanimous Supreme Court declared the Act
unconstitutional on separation of powers and Commerce Clause grounds in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.'3
The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 193536 was also written in living
Constitution terms. The Act set price controls for the national coal market and tried
'3' Id. at 395.
132 Id. at 393.
3 Id. at 395.
13' National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 195 (1933).
1 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
136 Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991.
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to regulate wages and hours for coal workers. Its preamble claimed that "the general
welfare of the Nation require[d]" such regulation because bituminous coal
production was "affected with a national public interest."'' 7 For a generation,
Progressives had used the "affected with a public interest" test, which had originally
justified rate regulation only over legal monopolies, to regulate rates and business
conditions for any business that threatened Progressive conceptions of the public
interest; 138 the most ardent New Dealers extended this idea from property regulation
to federalism by claiming that federal regulation was necessary whenever a local
activity was "affected with a national public interest." When the Supreme Court
considered the Bituminous Coal Act in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,'39 this preamble
provoked Justice George Sutherland enough to include in his opinion for the Court
an eight-page civics lecture explaining why Congress did not have a catch-all power
to regulate for the national interest or the general welfare. 40
By contrast, the National Labor Relations Act, 4 ' the first New Deal law to
survive Commerce Clause review in the Supreme Court, was written by legal
craftsmen. This Act established the National Labor Relations Board and gave
American employees a federal right to collective bargaining. Its preamble made no
claim that labor relations were affected with a national interest; it only purported to
find that labor strife obstructed the free flow of interstate commerce. 42 As Peter
Irons recounted, the narrowness of these findings helped to convince Chief Justice
Hughes and Justice Roberts to switch their votes from opposing federal jurisdiction
over labor relations in Carter and Schechter Poultry to supporting it in National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 14 3
If Carter, Schechter Poultry, and Jones & Laughlin are indicative, Congress and
President Roosevelt had to abandon sweeping political claims to regulate problems
of national interest. Instead, they learned to write statutes with dry economic
findings explaining why the activities they wanted to regulate had an effect on
interstate commerce. So disciplined, Congress and President Roosevelt's lawyers
managed to shepherd the New Deal legislative agenda through the federal judiciary.
'31 Id. at 991.
' See, e.g., German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914) (holding that the
insurance business was "affected with a public interest" such that the Due Process Clause
would not stop states from regulating insurance rates); see also GOODNOW, supra note 53,
at 266-74 (examining the application of the "affected with a public interest" test).
"3 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
140 See id. at 289-97.
" National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
151-69 (2000)).
,42 See National Labor Relations Act § 1, quoted in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 23 n.2 (1937).
143 See PETER IRONs, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 244-46, 280-89 (1982).
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B. The Rise of the Rational Basis Test: A Second-Best Compromise
In response to the New Deal lawyers' economic arguments, the federal judiciary
developed a new economic and process-oriented Commerce Clause doctrine. This
doctrine eventually settled into the form we now know as the rational basis test.
Within the framework of the New Deal legislative agenda, the rational basis test
generated all the judicial results that the New Deal "social evangelists" would have
wanted if the federal courts had given credence to their vision of a living Commerce
Clause. The statutes drafted in rational basis terms withstood judicial scrutiny better
than the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Bituminous Coal Act, because
they did not force federal judges to confront the question whether the Commerce
Clause gives Congress a general-welfare power.
The key innovation in the rational basis test was to expand what it meant for an
activity to "affect" interstate commerce. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and
Justice Benjamin Cardozo were most responsible for this innovation. During his
first stint on the Court as an associate justice, Hughes had written the Shreveport
Rate Cases, which gave the ICC power to set rates for local railroad runs on the
ground that low local rates provided a competitive alternative to, and thus
"affected," ICC-set rates for interstate railroad travel."' In dissent in the 1936 case
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,I45 Justice Cardozo proposed to lift this principle out of
its context in interstate common-carrier regulation 46 and let Congress regulate any
local activity that provided a competitive alternative to a federal scheme to regulate
interstate commerce. 147 In the 1937 "switch in time" case NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., then Chief Justice Hughes followed Justice Cardozo's advice
and used the same argument to uphold the National Labor Relations Act. 148
Hughes and Cardozo's innovation reversed the basic orientation of pre-1937
doctrine by reversing the direction of the "effects" test. Roughly speaking, from
Gibbons to the New Deal, the "effects" test tried to maintain a principled line
between interstate commerce and local activities; after the New Deal, Hughes and
See Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
145 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
146 See Cushman, supra note 36, at 1134 (discussing Justice Cardozo's dissenting opinion
in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.); see also supra note 124.
'41 See 298 U.S. 238, 329 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) ("[T]he prices for intrastate
sales of coal have so inescapable a relation to those for interstate sales that a system of
regulation for transactions of the one class is necessary to give adequate protection to the
system of regulation adopted for the other.").
148 See 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) ("Although activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens
and abstractions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control."); see also
Epstein, supra note 22, at 1443-54 (discussing the New Deal Commerce Clause cases).
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Cardozo's rendition of the test worked to engulf local activities. In pre-New Deal
case law, the Commerce Clause both defined and limited the proper objects of
federal commercial regulation. Congress could cite the Sweeping and Supremacy
Clauses to support federal regulation, but only after it was clear the law's primary
effect was to regulate interstate commerce.'49 After Hughes and Cardozo were
through, by contrast, whenever a local activity has any "effect" on interstate activity,
the Sweeping and Supremacy Clauses give Congress the push it needs to sweep that
activity under the Commerce Clause. "0 As much as Hughes and Cardozo changed
the "effects" test, post-New Deal Commerce Clause doctrine was still nowhere near
as radical as the Progressives and New Deal evangelists' vision of a living
Commerce Clause. To be sure, the new effects test was open-ended. Because any
activity can have some effect on any other, the new effects test could be used, in
principle, to cover any local activity with federal regulation. Because the test
continued to distinguish between interstate commerce and local activities, however,
it preserved the idea that the Commerce Clause was one of several limited and
enumerated federal powers. Chief Justice Hughes emphasized this reservation. In
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., he warned that the effects test "may not be extended
so as to embrace effects... so indirect and remote that to embrace them ... would
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and
create a completely centralized government."''
In any event, by the 1942 case Wickard v. Filburn, "2 the Court had built a new
constitutional doctrine on the foundations of Hughes and Cardozo's innovation.
Wickard proposed a standard explanation for "rational basis" review that discredited
all of the important elements of nineteenth-century Commerce Clause doctrine. The
first piece of this counter-narrative was to establish a new official meaning for
"commerce." Writing for the Court, Justice Robert Jackson read Gibbons v. Ogden
to say that Chief Justice Marshall first "described the federal commerce power with
a breadth never yet exceeded.' ' 53
149 See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
'SO See, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (194 1) (citation
omitted):
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is plenary and complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations
other than are prescribed in the Constitution. It follows that no form of state
activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the
commerce clause to Congress.
See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (asserting that the
commerce power "is plenary and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce 'no matter
what the source of the dangers which threaten it"') (quoting Mondou v. New York, New
Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 51 (1912)).
' Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 37.
5 317U.S. 111 (1942).
J Id. at 120. Canvassing the Court's pre-1937 language, he cited the early cases
[Vol. 11:403
THE LivING COMMERCE CLAUSE
Next, Justice Jackson cited economic reasons why the Court needed to abandon
the case law from Gibbons up to Jones & Laughlin and return to Chief Justice
Marshall's original sweeping vision. By the 1930s, he claimed, it was no longer
possible to draw meaningful distinctions between the local manufacture and the
interstate sales of nationwide businesses, and it would have wreaked financial chaos
to try. In a sophisticated and developed economy, there was no point in escaping
the "economic" fact that all activities are economically interdependent. "Once an
economic measure of the reach of the power granted to Congress in the Commerce
Clause is accepted," he concluded, "questions of federal power cannot be decided
simply by finding the activity in question to be 'production,' nor can consideration
of its economic effects be foreclosed by calling them 'indirect. "",
54
Finally, Jackson cited political process reasons why, in this new economic order,
the federal judiciary should defer to Congress's determinations about what does or
does not "affect" interstate commerce. From Gibbons v. Ogden until 1937,
deference had not been a strong theme in Commerce Clause case law. The Supreme
Court had declined to interfere in close cases out of comity toward Congress, but it
did not hesitate to exercise independent judgment to enforce the dividing lines
between the federal and local.' 55 In Wickard, however, Justice Jackson warned that
"effective restraints on [the commerce power's] exercise must proceed from political
rather than from judicial processes."' 56 After all, economic policy choices "are
wisely left under our system to resolution by the Congress under its more flexible
and responsible legislative process."' 15 7
emphasizing that "commerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a
practical one, drawn from the course of business." Id. at 122 (quoting Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905)). In pre-1937 terminology, this remark signaled that one
would have to gauge the effects of the law on interstate commerce, intrastate commerce, and
manufacture to determine which of the three it primarily regulated. See supra notes 35-41
and accompanying text. After Wickard, lawyers have read this remark far more expansively
to signal that the Commerce Clause covers any and all local activities that could "affect" the
interstate economy in any conceivable way. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
615, 618 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
114 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124; see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 41 (1937):
When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their relation
to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how can it be
maintained that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into
which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect interstate
commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war?
5 See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 177-78 (1908) (recognizing
congressional discretion but finding labor law to be outside the Commerce Clause),
overruled by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
' Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824)).
'17 Id. at 129; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting):
Courts must give Congress a degree of leeway in determining the existence of
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Wickard proposed what are now the standard explanations for rational basis
review. This explanation emphasizes economics- and process-based concerns. Still,
the test allows in substance most of the political results that the Progressives and
idealistic New Dealers hoped to achieve. Like living Constitution theory, it gives
Congress expansive powers to regulate economic matters,'58 and it instructs federal
courts to defer to Congress when Congress is determining the limits on its own
jurisdiction.'
At the same time, the standard explanations for rational basis review avoided all
the pitfalls that made living Commerce Clause ideas seem threatening to
conservative politicians and judges during the New Deal. The living Commerce
Clause would have given Congress power to regulate whatever captures the
attention of the American zeitgeist; the rational basis test stays closer to the core
meaning of "interstate commerce" by giving Congress power, at least in the first
instance, only over gainful economic activities. The living Commerce Clause would
have ordered federal courts to defer to Congress on all structural constitutional
issues on the ground that courts are not in tune with the mandates of politics in a
historicist society;, the rational basis test gives the judiciary more polite excuses to
defer to Congress, namely Congress's superior institutional competence at fact-
finding and policy-making. Most important of all, the living Commerce Clause
clearly would have undermined the basic principle of limited and enumerated
federal powers; the rational basis test preserved some semblance of continuity with
Article I.
C. The Ambiguities in the Rational Basis Test After the New Deal
Still, the rational basis test came with a price. Because it purported to be value-
neutral and economic, it severed New Deal Commerce Clause constitutional law
doctrine from the principles animating the New Deal political agenda. It thus
concealed important theoretical tensions: Was the New Deal national expansion
defined by the economics- and process-based arguments at work in the rational basis
test? Or were these ideas just window dressing for the courts, in which case the real
constitutional transformation occurred when political activists, inspired by living
Constitution ideas, converted a federal government of limited powers into a national
government of general powers?
In addition, the rational basis test did not eliminate the tensions between post-
a significant factual connection between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce - both because the Constitution delegates the commerce power
directly to Congress and because the determination requires an empirical
judgment of a kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to make with
accuracy.
'58 See supra notes 10 1-16 and accompanying text.
,' See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
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New Deal Commerce Clause doctrine and Article I of the Constitution; it only
finessed them. The Jones & Laughlin Court disclaimed any intention to allow the
new "effects" test to let Congress's powers reach all aspects of local regulation.
That was easy to say in 1937, when Congress and the President were agitating only
for greater control of local economic issues. But what would follow if Congress
should ever start legislating on social-reform issues that had at most only a tenuous
connection to interstate business?
After the New Deal, when historians and constitutional theorists tried to assess
the New Deal transformation, many observers interpreted the New Deal precedents
in ways that would have pleased the "social evangelists" who sought to establish a
"living Commerce Clause." Most interpretations tended to respect the form of the
rational basis test, but they did so in a way that gave that test a sweeping reach. The
commentary on Wickard is illustrative. The case could be read to stand for the
proposition that the federal judiciary should apply deferential rational basis review
when the law under review regulates modem economic conditions. But, for at least
two generations, most commentators read Wickard to stand for the broad principles
that Congress has general regulatory powers and that the federal judiciary had
"abandoned any effort to articulate and enforce... limits on congressional power"
inherent in the Commerce Clause. 6'
On the other hand, while the Supreme Court continued to review Commerce
Clause challenges deferentially, it did so strictly within the confines of the rational
basis test. On occasion, the test led to strange conclusions, especially when the law
at issue presented political issues more dramatic than the issues ordinarily raised by
economic regulation. For instance, to uphold the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Supreme Court went out of its way to avoid considering the real purpose of the Act,
to repudiate and discredit private and state-sponsored discrimination on the basis of
race. Instead, the Court declared the Act constitutional on the strange ground that
local discrimination by segregated barbeques and other establishments might
depress the national economy.' 6' Of course the Court recognized that "Congress
was also dealing with what it considered a moral problem," but it nevertheless
resolved the constitutional question by relying on "the overwhelming evidence of
the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial
intercourse."' 62 In other cases, the Court often proclaimed that "the power to
regulate commerce" was "broad indeed," but it just as often hastened to add that this
60 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 5-1, at 297 (2nd ed. 1988);
see also 1 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY & WILLIAM JEFFREY, JR., POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION: IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 292 (1953); THOMAS R. POWELL,
VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1956).
161 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964) (holding that
"discrimination in restaurants had a direct and highly restrictive effect upon interstate travel
by Negroes").
162 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964).
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power "has limits."' 63
Nevertheless, as time passed, these tensions faded out of mind. Members of
Congress, federal prosecutors, and federal regulators probably became more and
more accustomed to the idea that they could make policy on national problems
whenever they thought those problems demanded a national solution. By the 1970s,
Congress began to enact commercial regulations without legislative findings that the
activity being regulated affected interstate commerce. Federal courts upheld the
regulations anyway. In one case, a district court rejected a Commerce Clause
challenge to an in rem seizure of a medical device, under a statute that had no nexus
to interstate commerce of any kind, simply by deferring to Congress's judgment that
it would be "cumbersome and time consuming" for the government to prove that it
had constitutional jurisdiction for the seizure.'(' As the New Deal faded into the
distant past, the political and legal communities gradually forgot the conceptual
tools they would have needed to understand the problems that would arise if this
tension in theory should ever surface in practice.
IV. LOPEZ AND MORRISON: THE LIVING COMMERCE CLAUSE RESURFACES?
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison have turned a tension that
had always been a theoretical possibility into an urgent practical question. Each
case presented a challenge to a federal law that forced the Supreme Court to ask
itself how far rational basis deference could extend in principle. As a result, these
cases forced into the open questions about constitutional federalism that the rational
basis test has postponed since the New Deal. Even more interesting, most of the
opinions in these cases express ideas that echo the political ideas at work during the
Progressive Era and the New Deal.
Both Lopez and Morrison presented challenges to laws focusing on the tension
between the standard explanations for the rational basis test and the general principle
of national government for which that test stands. Lopez presented a challenge to
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 65 which made it a federal crime to possess a
firearm within 1000 feet of a school, 6 6 and Morrison presented a challenge to one
provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,167 which created a federal
163 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968).
164 United States v. Depilatron Epilator Model No. DP-206 Universal Technology Inc.,
473 F. Supp. 913, 914-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting S. REP, No. 94-33, at 14 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1083, and citing 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(2)(D) (1976)).
16 Gun-Free School Zones Act, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45
(1990) (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a), 922(q), 924(a) (1988)) (repealed 1996).
166 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 & n.l (1995) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§
921(a)(25), 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (amended 1996)).
167 Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
40302, 108 Stat. 1796, 1941-42 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)).
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tort action for the victims of gender-motivated violence.' If the rational basis test
was an adaptation of the Commerce Clause to an interconnected industrial economy,
and if Article I continued to set any meaningful limits on the scope of Congress's
powers, these cases presented plausible test cases for establishing those limits. But
if the rational basis test stood for the principle that only Congress can determine the
limits on its own jurisdiction, these cases presented opportunities to establish that
principle beyond any doubt. Rational basis review had postponed these sorts of
issues for nearly sixty years, but Lopez and Morrison, made it impossible to avoid
them any longer.
A Court majority held Lopez and Morrison crossed over the line, while four
dissenters thought the line still had not been crossed. Writing for the Court in
Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist disclaimed any intention to call the New Deal
expansion into question: Jones & Laughlin and Wickard, he acknowledged,
reflected a necessary "recognition of the great changes that had occurred in the way
business was carried on in this country" and "a view that earlier Commerce Clause
cases artificially had constrained the authority of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce."' 69 But the Chief Justice also insisted that this expansion did not change
the Commerce Clause's position within Article I, which "creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers."'7 0 If Jones & Laughlin and Wickard's effects
test were to apply with equal force to every federal regulation, it would "bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States."'' To prevent this result, Rehnquist limited
the reach of the effects test to "economic activity that might, through repetition
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce."' Because neither
gun possession near schools' nor gender-motivated violence'74 constitutes
"economic" activity, neither the Gun-Free School Zones Act nor the tort provisions
of the Violence Against Women Act fell within Congress's commerce powers.75
168 SeeUnited States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981
(2000)).
169 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
170 Id. at 552.
I' d. at 567.
172 Id.; see also id. at 559-61 (canvassing cases from Jones & Laughlin to Lopez and
concluding that they all spoke to regulations of "economic activity").
17 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62.
174 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000).
"' Even though Morrison eliminated the civil remedy provided by section 40302 of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, the remaining provisions of the Act continue "to
promote public safety, health, and activities" relating to crimes of violence motivated by
gender. See, e.g., Press Release, Violence Against Women Office, U.S. Department of
Justice, Justice Department Awards Over $162 Million to States, Rural Communities and
Colleges and Universities to Address Violence Against Women (Oct. 12, 2000), http://
www.usnewswire.com/OJP/docs/ojpOOO 113.html.
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The results in Lopez and Morrison surely came as surprises, but it was also
interesting to see that most of the majority opinions echo many of the pro-state
government themes voiced in the incrementalist and states' rights tendencies in
Progressive political thought. The Court opinion in Lopez quoted Jones & Laughlin
to make clear that Article I, section 8 would at some point stop the rational basis test
from serving to "effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local."' 76 The Court opinions in Lopez and Morrison echo reservations
voiced by Progressives like Wilson and Croly when they emphasized that education,
criminal law, and family law are activities that have "always been the province of
the states."' 77
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez, joined by Justice O'Connor
reflect the same themes even more strongly. Justice Kennedy declared that "[s]tare
decisis operates with great force in counseling [the Court] not to call in question the
essential principles now in place" over federal commercial regulation since the New
Deal. ' Kennedy declared his intention to consider future Commerce Clause
challenges on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the law "upsets the federal
balance to a degree that renders it an unconstitutional assertion of the commerce
power."' 79 But Justice Kennedy appears to see that balance in many of the same
terms as the Progressives did in their pro-local government moods. To be sure, he
cited The Federalist Papers, but he stressed themes like state sovereignty, and the
traditional roles of the states.8 0 He borrowed a Progressive theme by praising the
states as "laboratories of experimentation.""' When he praised federalism as "the
unique contribution of the Framers to political science and political theory,"' 82 he
echoed Woodrow Wilson, who three generations earlier praised the states as "our
great and permanent contribution to constitutional development."' 83 And at the end
of the day, he found it dispositive that education that education and criminal law
were "traditional concern[s] of the States.'18 4
The one majority opinion that did not echo these themes came from Justice
Thomas, who authored a concurring opinion calling into question all of the Court's
176 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
37 (1937)).
"' Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; cf. WILSON, supra note 55, at 183
("The States possess all the ordinary legal choices that shape a people's life... [including]
the regulation of domestic relations ... the definition of crimes and their punishment.").
178 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
17' Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
180 See id. at 575-55 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
181 Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
182 Id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
183 WILSON, supra note 55, at 50.
184 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Commerce Clause case law from 1937 onward. Applying plain-meaning and
structural interpretation principles, he concluded that, if "commerce" encompassed
activities like "manufacture" and "agriculture," the Commerce Clause, the Foreign
and Indian Commerce Clauses,'85 and the Port Preference Clause"8 6 would all be
unintelligible, because it is impossible to conduct "manufacture" between states or
with foreign and Indian nations.'87 He attacked the reading of Gibbons v. Ogden
made familiar by Wickard, that Gibbons "established that Congress may control all
local activities that 'significantly affect interstate commerce.""88 And he warned
that the Court's construction of the Commerce Clause and the Sweeping Clause
since the New Deal renders "many of Congress' other enumerated powers...
wholly superfluous.'
9
It came as no surprise that Lopez and Morrison provoked dissents, because they
were the first two cases in almost sixty years in which the Supreme Court used the
Commerce Clause to strike down federal enactments. But the dissents in Lopez and
Morrison were vitriolic. Justice Stevens wrote a short dissent in Lopez warning that
the Court's opinion was "extraordinary" for its "radical character."' ' In both cases,
Justice Souter hurled at the majority the worst judicial insult imaginable after the
New Deal, accusing the Court of taking a "backward glance at... the old pitfalls"
of Lochner-style substantive due process judicial activism.' 9' And in Morrison,
Justice Breyer'92 and Justice Souter'93 intimated for four Justices that they shall
refuse to accept the Lopez holding as good law in future cases.
Strangely, as certain as the Lopez and Morrison dissenters professed to be that
the Court's decisions were wrong, they were not nearly so certain why those
decisions were wrong. For the most part, Justice Souter's dissent in Lopez hurled
"Lochnerism" charges at the Court majority. But his dissent in Morrison vacillated
between Lochnerism charges and "political safeguards" arguments, which claimed
that Commerce Clause challenges are nonjusticiable.'94 In Lopez, Justice Breyer
185 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations... and with the Indian Tribes.").
.86 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 ("No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of
Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another.").
187 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 586-88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
188 Id. at 593 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
189 Id. at 588 (Thomas, J., concurring).
190 Id. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'9' Id. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
643-44 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
192 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 662 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
'9' Id. at 655 (Souter, J., dissenting).
'94 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 647 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[P]olitics, not judicial review,
should mediate between state and national interests as the strength and legislative jurisdiction
of the National Government inevitably increased through the expected growth of the national
economy.").
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made a fairly standard defense of the most expansive reading of the rational basis
test. But in Morrison, Breyer shifted to political safeguard arguments like
Souter' s, 9 and, even more creatively, analogized the Commerce Clause to the "hard
look" doctrine in federal administrative law'96 and the "subsidiarity" doctrine under
the organic law of the European Union. 1
97
Most telling of all, the dissents did not confront the tensions the rational basis
test has concealed ever since the New Deal. On its face, the rational basis test
professes to stay faithful to Article I, but in operation the test does not provide any
principle for setting an intelligible limit on the scope of federal power. The dissents
suffer from the very same tension. On one hand, Justice Breyer began his dissent
in Morrison by professing that "[n]o one denies the importance of the Constitution's
federalist principles."' 98 On the other hand, Justice Souter demonstrated in dissent
in both cases that one of his favorite words for the commerce power is the adjective
"plenary."' 99 And in Lopez, Justice Breyer professed to be genuinely puzzled why
the Court would "threaten[] legal uncertainty in an area of law that, until this case,
seemed reasonably well settled. ''2°° In other words, everyone always knew the
rational basis test was a rubber-stamp, so why upset expectations now? Indeed,
when Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas challenged Justice Breyer to name
a single activity that was committed exclusively to state regulation, Breyer did not
respond to the challenge.
20
'
As harshly as Lopez and Morrison were criticized on the Court, they received
even worse treatment off the Court. Lower federal judges have criticized these
decisions202 and have by and large declined to apply them to other federal laws.203
'9' See id. at 660-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics
Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000)).
,9' Id. at 663 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
19' Id. at 655.
'99 See id. at 639 n. 12,640-41,645,646 n. 14,648 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 609 (Souter, J., dissenting).
200 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
201 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65 (Rehnquist, C.J.) ("Although JUSTICE BREYER argues
that acceptance of the Government's rationales would not authorize a general federal police
power, he is unable to identify any activity that the States may regulate but Congress may
not.") (citing id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting)); id. at 600 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he
principal dissent insists that there are limits [to the Commerce Clause], but it cannot muster
even one example.") (citing id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
202 See Louis H. Pollak, Foreword to Symposium, Reflections on United States v. Lopez,
94 MICH. L. REV. 533, 551 & n.96 (1995) (noting that lower federal courts already have
shown some signs of disagreement and citing several conflicting decisions).
203 See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brandon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or
What If The Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000
Wisc. L. REV. 369 (reviewing the treatment of Lopez in the lower federal courts and
concluding that the overwhelming majority of district and circuit judges are ignoring the
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Academics have excoriated Lopez and Morrison. Cass Sunstein has criticized the
cases as "extremely aggressive."24 Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have cited
them as proof of a "paradigm shift" by the Rehnquist Court,2 5 the start of a
"constitutional revolution" that threatens to "redraw the constitutional map as we
have known it." 2 6 To be fair, other academics, like Glenn Reynolds and Brandon
Denning, profess to be as enthusiastic about this "revolution" as Sunstein, Balkin,
and Levinson profess to be dismayed.0 7
While other theorists do not share Sunstein, Balkin, and Levinson's sense of
outrage, they still treat Lopez and Morrison as monumental decisions. Mark
Tushnet has concluded that Lopez and Morrison mark a "constitutional moment"
within Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional regime transformations.2 8 While
expressed some early reservations, he now interprets Lopez and Morrison as the
death knell for the New Deal. In his view, they portend a sweeping regime change
in which "the New Deal/Great Society political system is no longer in place, and
.. '[t]he Warren Court is dead."' 20 9
Most telling of all, members of Congress are listening to this revolutionary talk.
High-ranking members of the Senate Judiciary Committee are currently considering
whether to use federal judicial nominees' views about federalism as grounds to deny
them confirmation 10
V. LOPEZ AND MORRISON IN LIGHT OF THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND THE NEW DEAL
This is an extraordinary level of controversy and criticism, even for two
Supreme Court decisions. Constitutional law decisions attract attention from time
to time, but it is rare for a structural provision like the Commerce Clause to be the
focus of such prolonged controversy. Why have these decisions prompted
case).
204 Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 757 & n.2 (2001).
205 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 15, at 1051.
206 Id. at 1053; see also id. at 1056-57 (wondering whether Lopez and Morrison will have
only limited impact, or if the "economic" limitation in these cases is "strategic," and the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence "could become much more radical and far
ranging").
207 See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 203, at 399 (characterizing Lopez as possibly a
"bold and telling blow for limited government and a return to the first principles of the
Constitution").
208 Tushnet, Living, supra note 18, at 266 (citing ACKERMAN, supra iiote 18, at 266).
209 Tushnet, New Constitutional Order, supra note 18, at 30 (alteration in original)
(quoting Cass R. Sunstein, What Judge Bork Should Have Said, 23 CONN. L. REV. 205, 205
(1991)).
210 See Judicial Nomination and Confirmation Process, supra note 13, at 1 (statement of
Sen. Charles E. Schumer); Edward Walsh, Panel Debates Senate Role on Court Choices,
WASH. POST, June 27, 2001, at A23; see also supra text accompanying note 13.
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accusations that Lopez and Morrison are extraordinarily wrong, even revolutionary?
And why all the vitriol, if these cases present questions as abstruse as whether
gender-motivated violence can be classified as "non-economic," or as fact-intensive
as whether gun violence in schools drags down American productivity by deterring
students from learning in school?
The short answer is that Lopez and Morrison mark the re-emergence of the
Commerce Clause as an issue in constitutional politics. Lawyers are used to
thinking of the Constitution as a source of law, but we sometimes forget that the
Constitution also can serve as a source of inspiration and principle - a guide to
good government and political practice. Abraham Lincoln, to take just one example,
could not have created a winning political coalition against the Dred Scott decision
if he had not been so adept at explaining the Constitution in terms that integrated
legal doctrine with political practice. He once likened the Constitution to a "picture
of silver," made "to adorn and preserve" the "apple of gold" he saw in the political
principles of the Declaration of Independence."'
The Commerce Clause informed legal and political practice alike until the
rational basis test came along. Nineteenth-century Commerce Clause legal doctrine
relied not only on the Clause's text but on some background political ideas that the
text was thought to promote. It was accepted that the American people would be
happier and better governed if their liberty and property were regulated locally
except when general interests like interstate trade, transportation, and
communication demanded otherwise. Progressive constitutional theory criticized
this idea as it manifested itself both in legal doctrine and in political practice. In
Progressive thought, the country's evolving national interests are too fluid and
evanescent for any group of dead white males to have captured in black ink on white
parchment two hundred years ago.
During the New Deal, by contrast, the law and the political practice built around
the Commerce Clause went in separate directions. Political idealists relied on
political conceptions about evolving national interests to agitate for a program of
economic redistribution and social reform run by a vigorous, activist national
government. These ideas were resisted by much of the federal judiciary, perhaps a
large segment of the American public, and even many of the idealists' fellow-
travelers (the legal craftsmen Schlesinger describes) because they jarred sharply
with the pre-existing legal and constitutional traditions of federalism. Lawyers and
courts postponed this tension by developing a value-neutral language built on
process-based rational basis arguments. These arguments put off the hard political
"1 Abraham Lincoln, Fragmentary Writing c. 1858, in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 168 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (quoting Proverbs 25:11). Mark Tushnet
makes this same complaint about individual rights constitutional law doctrine and uses this
same quotation from Lincoln. MARK TUsHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS 11 (1999).
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questions by making every Commerce Clause question seem, in Wickard v.
Filburn's famous phrase, a question "wisely left under our system to resolution by
the Congress under its more flexible and responsible legislative process."' 1
2
On occasion after the New Deal, this value-neutrality generated strange results.
Most students are puzzled to learn that the Supreme Court upheld one of the titles
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - perhaps the most worthy achievement of the
social-reform movement in the last century - on the ground that segregated
barbeques and other establishments might depress the national economy." 3 As one
commentator caustically observed, if the Court had been sincere, segregationists
could have wiped out the basis for federal jurisdiction by ordering more barbeque. 2,4
But in most other cases, the rational basis test effectively kept the federal courts out
of the way and generated little dissonance in the process.
But Lopez and Morrison exposed that dissonance, and the clearest proof that
they did so comes in the outrage they have provoked. These decisions would not
be controversial if they only focused on questions about whether Congress has
jurisdiction to determine whether guns in schools or violence against women impairs
national productivity. Rather, these decisions struck a political nerve - a strong
political attachment to the idea of an activist federal government. A large segment
of American political and legal elites, it seems, has always conflated the rational
basis test with some political idea like the principle that Congress should have
national powers to attack national problems. This notion resembles the living
Commerce Clause for which Progressives and New Deal social reformers agitated
much more than it resembles the ideas behind the rational basis test.
This idea of a vigorous national government, not checked by the federal
judiciary, has roots in the New Deal, but it is not the only intellectual tradition that
emerged from the New Deal. Lopez and Morrison do not really repudiate the New
Deal; they test the limits of a settlement struck during it. In the critical New Deal
Commerce Clause cases, the federal courts and more cautious lawyers balked at the
idea that Congress has a power to regulate for the general welfare. The Supreme
Court sanctioned an expansion of the Commerce Clause on the narrower ground
that, in a modem industrial economy, "the relevance of the economic effects in the
application of the Commerce Clause" could no longer be denied.1 5 This rationale
postponed some fundamental questions about how the New Deal expansion relates
to Article I of the Constitution, which creates a constitutional system of limited and
enumerated federal powers. Sixty years later, Lopez and Morrison are forcing those
postponed questions back onto the table.
A few conclusions follow. The most obvious and simplest is that, contrary to
12 317 U.S. 11, 129 (1942).
213 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964).
214 HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGs 95 (1990). Arkes attributes this remark to a colleague.
25 Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 123 (1942).
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many accounts, we are not witnessing the advent of a "revolution" or a
"constitutional moment" built around American federalism. To be sure, Lopez and
Morrison represent a new chapter in a long-running political struggle over
constitutional federalism going back the Progressive Era. But they are only one
chapter, not a new storyline. Far from repudiating the New Deal, Lopez and
Morrison suggest that, over the last generation, Congress has started to legislate on
topics about which the New Deal's "regime principles" do not speak with any single
or clear intention. The majority and dissenting positions in these cases can each
draw on different resources within Progressive political theory and New Deal legal
theory to support their arguments. Thus, Lopez and Morrison do not signal a
judicial revolution. They merely note that the time has come for a candid
reexamination about how far the New Deal went in transforming the Constitution's
commitment to limited and enumerated federal powers into a grant of general and
unlimited powers.
Second, and pessimistically, this candid reexamination may never take place,
for reasons both political and legal. Politically, the rational basis test has been quite
effective at taking the Commerce Clause off the table of constitutional clauses the
federal courts are willing to enforce in a serious way. If Lopez and Morrison are
controversial, one can only imagine the controversy the Court would engender if it
reexamined the origins of the rational basis test in a candid way.
There are similar legal problems. At a fundamental level, law, especially
constitutional law, needs to preserve the appearance that legal doctrine follows in
an understandable way from the fundamental authority for the doctrine. In an
important sense, living Commerce Clause ideas are incompatible with Article I of
the Constitution. If judges like Hughes and Cardozo developed the rational basis
test to avoid the fault line between these ideas and Article I, it is a little late in the
day for their successors to reopen that fault now that sixty years of reliance interests
are sitting on it. As will be seen below, I disagree with Justice Kennedy when he
says that stare decisis arguments prevent him from reconsidering Jones & Laughlin
and Wickard, but he is right to recognize a serious legitimacy problem here.
Finally, even if Kennedy and his colleagues were inclined to conduct this
reexamination, the rational basis test has been so effective at covering over
important substantive issues that the legal system has in large part lost the
conceptual tools it needs to conduct such a reexamination. This gap presents less
of a problem for jurists like Justice Thomas, who relies heavily on plain and
original-meaning principles of interpretation - though his approach would raise
doctrinal problems like those raised under the pre-1937 "effects" test if his position
ever became Court doctrine. 16 Still, it does present a serious problem for the Lopez
majority and the Lopez dissenters.
216 See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
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VI. THE LvING COMMERCE CLAUSE CONSIDERED
A. The Economic-Effects Rule and Article I
Yet even if everyone pretends to ignore the 800-pound gorilla in the room, that
is not the same thing as saying the gorilla is not there. Even though no one on the
Court has expressed an interest in reintegrating Commerce Clause case law to
substantive political commitments, intellectual clarity still requires that this
connection be explored. Most important, the living Commerce Clause arguments
Progressives and New Dealers made 75 years ago may capture the hostility toward
Lopez and Morrison better than any legal arguments being made now.
Lopez and Morrison's critics, and particularly the dissenting Justices in these
cases, need to confront the tensions that the rational basis test has concealed since
the New Deal. During the Progressive Era, leading thinkers were of two minds
about whether the living Commerce Clause could engulf local regulation. During
the New Deal, most reformers agreed that Commerce Clause doctrine had to change
to make way for New Deal economic regulation, but many took issue with the idea
that the Commerce Clause should be converted explicitly into a national general-
welfare power in defiance of Article I. The rational basis test, and particularly its
"effects" rule, finessed this dispute, but it did not settle it.
If this question is still open, Lopez and Morrison's critics need to decide now
whether they agree that Article I sets any workable limits on the scope of Congress's
powers. An act like the Gun-Free School Zones Act gives rise to at least a serious
question whether Article I has any force in limiting the scope of federal powers.
The Constitution presupposes in very simple ways that Article I does have such
force. The Constitution does so simply by virtue of being a constitution - a
compact in which federal officials agree to follow written grants of constitutional
power when they regulate the people they serve. Article I, section 1 limits federal
powers by vesting in Congress only those "legislative Powers herein granted."'2 17
And Article I, section 8 reinforces that conclusion by specifically enumerating
seventeen specific sets of congressional powers.218
The economic-effects rule from Wickard v. Filburn and other cases has always
threatened to reverse this basic orientation of Article I. In theory, any activity can
have an economic effect on any other activity. Consider one illustration cited by the
district court in the Morrison case: If there is no principled limit on the cumulative-
effects test, and if domestic violence cumulatively affects interstate commerce,
Congress must also have jurisdiction over insomnia, which may have anywhere
from one to eight times as much of an economic effect on the national economy as
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
218 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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domestic violence.2" 9 In 1937, when Chief Justice Hughes reoriented the effects test
to make way for federal labor and manufacture regulation, that test did not pose as
much of a threat to the federal-state structure as the idea of a living Commerce
Clause because family law, morals legislation, education, and a wide variety of other
fields were virtually free of federal control. In 2002, circumstances are different.
The effects doctrine from Jones & Laughlin and Wickard is now being applied to
local activities, including gun possession near schools or sexual attacks, that create
a plausible concern that the rational basis doctrine has created a general federal
power. Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Cardozo, the founders of the modem
"effects" doctrine, were not willing to press the doctrine this far.22° If Lopez and
Morrison's critics intend to do so, they must explain why.
On that basis, it is not enough for Lopez and Morrison's critics to criticize the
Court majority for trying to establish a limiting principle on the "effects" rule; they
have to provide a better limiting principle if they think one exists. To date, the
critics have issued a great deal of criticism, but they have been much more reticent
when it comes to proposing constructive alternatives. Justice Breyer, for instance,
criticized the Lopez decision for injecting uncertainty into Commerce Clause
doctrine,22' but he declined to name any examples of local activities beyond
Congress's powers even when pressed to do so. Justices Souter and Breyer have
suggested the Court's distinction between "economic" and "non-economic"
activities is arbitrary,222 and academics like Lawrence Lessig and Michael Dorf have
suggested the same in recent scholarship,223 but again, none of them have suggested
a less arbitrary standard that might reconcile the rational basis test to Article I's
structure.
These arguments are incomplete if one accepts that Article I still has a role to
play in defining the relationship between the states and the federal government. If
219 See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,792-93 (W.D. Va.
1996) ("If such a claim ... sufficed, Congress's power would extend to an unbounded
extreme.").
220 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (warning that the
effects test "must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not
be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that
to embrace them ... would effectively obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local"); United States v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935)
(Cardozo, J., concurring) ("There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local.").
221 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 630 ("The... legal problem created by the Court's [Lopez]
holding is that it threatens legal uncertainty in an area of law that, until this case, seemed
reasonably well settled.").
222 See id. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 627-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223 See Michael C. Dorf, The Good Society, Commerce, and the Rehnquist Court, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 2161,2172-76 (2001); Lawrence Lessig, TranslatingFederalism: United
States v. Lopez, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 125, 203-06.
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it does, then critics must propose a meaningful distinction between the federal and
local that is less arbitrary and engenders less uncertainty than the rule Lopez and
Morrison established. If Article I has residual constitutional value - out of respect
for the basic principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law, some watered-down
theory of textualism or originalism, or any other reason - it is not enough to say
that a rule enforcing it engenders uncertainty. Rather, one must show that the
uncertainty is so severe that it is effectively impossible to continue to enforce Article
I. Thus far, the Court's rule does not seem too arbitrary. This rule has a respectable
pedigree in foundational cases like Jones & Laughlin and Wickard, and it has been
applied in fairly straightforward fashion to federal laws purporting to regulate guns
in schools and sexual attacks. If critics disagree, they owe a responsibility to
propose a better rule or to explain why Article I should go by the board. To date,
they have not taken this opportunity.
This issue is particularly critical because the other main components of the
rational basis test probably cannot extend to the kinds of regulations considered in
Lopez and Morrison unless this issue is first resolved. The rational basis test
depends not only on this claim of economic interdependence but also on the claims
that "commerce" has a sweeping meaning, covering all economic activities, and that
Commerce Clause issues are better left to the legislative process than to judicial
review. Whether or not the Commerce Clause was originally meant to cover general
economic activity,224 "commerce" cannot be used to reach activities like gun
possession unless economic interdependence makes it truly impossible to distinguish
between the interstate economy and local affairs. Similarly, the only plausible way
to apply the political-process arguments cited in Wickard and the political-
safeguards arguments in the Morrison dissent22 is to establish that, in an
interconnected economy, it is simply impossible for courts to use judge-made rules
to distinguish between interstate transactions, school gun violence, and the like.
In short, the acts under review in Lopez and Morrison push the distinction
between national and local so far that Lopez and Morrison's critics have a choice to
224 Compare Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 695, 702-06 (1996), Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 111-32 (2001), and Epstein, supra note 22, at 1393-99 (all
interpreting "commerce" to mean "trade"), with 3 CROSSKEY & JEFFERY, supra note 160, at
131-48, WALTON H. HAMILTON & DOUGLAss ADAIR, THE POWER TO GOVERN: THE
CONSTITUTION - THEN AND Now 145-58 (1937), Lawrence Lessig, Translating
Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 125, 129-30, and Grant S. Nelson
& Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to
Uphold Federal CommercialRegulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85
IOWA L. REV. 1, 35-50 (1999) (all interpreting "commerce" to mean "economic activity").
22 See Saikrishna Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Theories of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001) (discussing the implausibility of
political process arguments).
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make. If they think that Article I still sets some limits on the scope of federal power,
the time has come for them to acknowledge as much. If so, they must acknowledge
that Article I has some value, that there need to be some meaningful limits on the
scope of Congress's Commerce powers, and they have to propose limits that might
do a more credible job than the "economic" limits the Lopez majority created to
enforce the boundaries between national and local regulation. And if they make
such acknowledgments, it is probably time to abandon the talk of "judicial
activism."
B. The Living Commerce Clause Considered
On the other hand, if the critics wish to claim that there are no principled limits
on the scope of Congress's commerce powers, then they are probably going to need
a constitutional theory for erasing Article I. Supreme Court cases from Jones &
Laughlin to Lopez interpreted the Commerce Clause expansively, but none of them
ever claimed that the fact of economic interdependence eliminated Article I
federalism. This claim would require a new constitutional argument. Such an
argument would probably have to establish why the understanding of the Commerce
Clause that prevailed from 1937 to 1995 sets the constitutional benchmark for
determining the scope of Congress's regulatory powers, and why other ideas about
original meaning, text, and constitutional structure must go by the board. It would
have to show why federal courts should not use judicial review to set any outer
limits on the scope of Congress's commerce powers. Most important of all, it would
have to go on to explain why the understanding of rational basis review widely
accepted after the New Deal is so authoritative, even in the face of legitimate
countervailing interpretive arguments that to set any limits on rational basis review
would be tantamount to a constitutional revolution.
And here, the Progressives' vision of a living Commerce Clause may provide
the conceptual tools necessary for making these arguments. If the rational basis test
was supposed to be an Ackermanian "professional narrative'226 justifying some idea
like the Progressives' living Commerce Clause, and if that narrative has now
exhausted its possibilities, perhaps it is time to go back to the Progressives' original
plan for an expanding national government. 227 According to this plan, as Woodrow
Wilson explained it, whenever "[c]hanges of fact and alterations of opinion" cause
226 ACKERMAN, supra note 18, at 38 (naming the "ongoing constitutional narrative
constructed by lawyers and judges" as the "professional narrative").
227 Liberal constitutional law theorists are borrowing from Progressive ideas in other areas
of constitutional law. For example, Mark Tushnet's recent work Taking the Constitution
Away from the Courts borrows heavily from Progressive ideas to explain why and how to
recover a tradition of populist constitutional politics. See TUSHNET, supra note 211 passim.
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the American "community of interest" to grow, the Commerce Clause automatically
gives the people national powers to match those new interests. 228
To be sure, cases like Carter Coal, in which the Supreme Court warned that
Congress does not have the power to legislate on subjects that affect the national
interest, would stand in the way of such a recovery.229 But, as Progressive theory
holds, times have changed. One of the country's two major political parties now
holds as a fundamental tenet the Progressive truth that "the Constitution ought to be
interpreted as a document that grows with our country and our history. 230
Progressive living Constitution theory accords in large part with mainline
contemporary academic views about constitutional interpretation - like Professor
Ackerman's theory of "constitutional moments," in which the American people are
engaged in a process of "ongoing construction of national identity" and "collective
self-definition. ',231 Such theory has also gathered considerable respect and
acceptance in many areas of constitutional law. For instance, in his now-influential
dissent from Poe v. Ullman, the second Justice Harlan described the Due Process
Clause as relying on a historical tradition that is "a living thing. A decision of this
Court which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which
builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. 232
Updating the Progressives' vision of a living Commerce Clause from 1910 to
2001, it would run something like the following. "We" the American people are a
very different people than the people that drafted and ratified the Constitution. We
have matured: We fought a Civil War to defeat some of the states' rights prejudices
that existed at the Founding, we overcame the economic problems created by the
laissez-faire assumptions of the original Constitution, and we have waged a civil-
rights movement to finish off the project we started during the Civil War.
228 WILSON, supra note 55, at 192.
229- See supra text accompanying notes 136-40.
230 Transcript: Debate Between Vice President Al Gore and George W. Bush, held by the
Presidential Debate Commission (Oct. 3, 2000) (statement by Vice President Gore), 2000
WL 1466168.
231 ACKERMAN, supra note 18, at 36.
232 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Casey v.
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J.
dissenting)); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Conner, J. concurring)
(citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)); William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, Address at the Georgetown
University Text and Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985), in 19 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 2
(1985):
But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text mean in our
time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might
have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great
principles to cope with current problems and current needs.
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As a result of these events and others, we now have a comprehensive national
regulatory state. We might as well recognize that text- or structure-based readings
of the Commerce Clause may not help us achieve the aspirations about national
identity that we want for our times. As the Due Process Clause encapsulates the
people's current and deeply held concerns about liberty and privacy, and as the
Equal Protection Clause does the same for their evolving conceptions of fairness,
so the Commerce Clause stands as a symbol of those activities that the American
people deem to be in their joint and collective interests. It may have made sense in
the nineteenth century to distinguish between "interstate trade" and local economic
regulation, and it may have made sense from the New Deal until the end of the
twentieth century to distinguish between federal "economic regulation" and state-
based "social regulation." But sixty years after the New Deal, the American people
have come to appreciate that their mutual interests reach much more widely than
this. The civil-rights movement, the women's-rights movement, and the social and
environmental causes of the 1960s and 1970s all presented the American people
with new challenges to overcome, and the people responded by demanding an ever-
more vigorous national government.
Along the same lines, the federal judiciary has no business interposing limits
when the political branches legislate on new topics of common national interest.
The judiciary is the least sensitive of the three branches to the changes in the
nation's deepest political inclinations. The courts have a useful role to play in
making sure that changes in the federal structure happen slowly and fairly. But they
can serve this function by enforcing the Constitution's individual rights provisions.
And they cannot use this function as an excuse for refusing to acknowledge all the
new national interests the American people have created since the New Deal. If they
do use their power this way, they will lose legitimacy by failing to recognize that
Congress has a better sense for the American people's will than the courts do.
Such an interpretation goes a long way toward making sense of the charges that
Lopez and Morrison are "revolutionary" decisions. If the American people's shared
sense of national identity fleshes out the Commerce Clause's meaning in any
generation, it becomes at least plausible that the New Deal might set a constitutional
baseline which has more authority to determine the scope of Congress's power than
pre-New Deal case law or Article I of the Constitution. Along the same lines, it
would be immaterial that many of the Progressives who proposed a living
Commerce Clause did not want it to extend to cover manufacture or labor233 or that
New Dealers did not want it to extend to cover family law and local government.234
As Progressives used a living Constitution to confront the national threats of their
day (the trusts and the railroads), and as the New Dealers did so for the problems of
their day (labor strife and overproduction), future generations should be left free to
233 See supra text accompanying notes 93-100.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 126-48.
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apply the same historicist principles to overcome the pressing problems of their day.
C. The Living Commerce Clause Reconsidered
Nevertheless, there would be obvious, and to my mind insurmountable,
problems with this living Commerce Clause argument. To begin with, it is difficult
if not impossible to reconcile this argument with other traditional tools of
interpretation. A "living Commerce Clause" simply cannot be squared with any
conception of "commerce" - whether "commerce" is understood as trade or as any
gainful economic activity - in the same manner that a "living Due Process Clause"
can be reconciled with "liberty," or a "living Equal Protection Clause" with
"equality." Likewise, the living Commerce Clause is incompatible with any reading
of the Constitution that tries to preserve a structural commitment to limited federal
powers.
But even taken on its own terms, living Constitution theory suffers from deep
interpretive problems as applied to the Commerce Clause. Progressives like
Woodrow Wilson were confident that they could "read[] our Constitution in its true
spirit, neither sticking in its letter nor yet forcing it arbitrarily to mean what we wish
it to mean." '235 On close examination, however, it is not clear that there is a middle
ground between these two extremes.
Living Constitution theory claims to build a theory of interpretation on group
experience and ordinary political opinion. In the view of thinkers like Wilson,
Croly, and Goodnow, it is impossible to apply the Constitution in what we now call
a "formalist" way: To insist that constitutional terms keep fixed meanings and that
the Constitution cannot be changed without following Article V's amendment
process.236 This is because political opinions, the raw material of political life,
change too frequently to build a stable system on any fixed and rigid constitutional
understandings. Like an animal, a constitutional order must adapt or die.237
Living Constitution theory solves this problem by grounding constitutional
meaning in an evolving historical American will. Government, "with life," Wilson
claims, "must change, alike in its objects and in its practices.' 2 8 But if, like the
Progressives, one intends to found a system of higher law on the American people's
group will or group consciousness, one needs a way to tease out their
"constitutional" opinions from their petty, base, and passion-driven opinions. For
instance, one must discern how it is that a judge or legislator could know that the
American people had "willed," in a constitutionally compelling way, that racial
discrimination be abolished in 1954 when a substantial minority of states enforced
235 WILSON, supra note 55, at 178.
236 See Gillman, supra note 50, at 230-31; see also supra text accompanying notes 63-72.
237 See WILSON, supra note 55, at 54-57.
238 Id. at 4-5.
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Jim Crow laws and a slight majority of the American people opposed racial
integration.239
The Progressives claimed to solve this problem by resorting to the concept of
Progress. As individuals, Americans may be slaves to the passions and interests that
drive their actions in their daily lives. As one people, however, their common
consciousness gives their politics fundamental meaning and direction. Historical
forces inspire that consciousness with intelligence, rationality, and intent that the
people could not grasp or acquire individually. Progress imparts constitutional
priorities to the people's will. 40
But because this idea of Progress radically subordinates the role of individual
reason and moral perception, it makes it virtually impossible for any single person
to apply a constitution to her times. Individuals do not determine the people's will;
the will comes to them, as a people, through historical forces and development.'
If the people need Progress to impart rationality and moral authority to their will,
and if Progress is beyond any individual person's powers of perception, there is no
way any single individual can grasp the rationality or the authority Progress imparts.
The interpreter cannot know whether she is, in Charles Kesler's words,
"distinguish[ing] the faint but swelling notes of progress" '42 from all the noise and
chaos in the people's changing opinions, or succumbing to a very theoretical form
of self-deception.
While this problem is particularly obvious in Progressive interpretive theory, it
deserves careful attention now because it inheres in any constitutional theory that
builds on the authority of common popular opinion. Many now-prevailing theories
of interpretation abandon the Progressives' commitment to Progress, but they agree
that constitutionalism rests on some sort of historically changing popular
consciousness. For instance, Bruce Ackerman's "constitutional moment" theory is
based on the principle that constitutionalism is a process of "ongoing construction
of national identity" and "collective self-definition," '243 in which political actors and
lawyers learn to follow a "higher law[]" that comes from the "mandate from the
People."2" The formal structure for Ackerman's regime changes - government by
strong presidents, whose visions are legislated by Congress and then ratified by the
judiciary after an overwhelming electoral victory245 - is operationally identical to
239 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 42 (199 1).
240 See WILSON, supra note 55, at 25-27. Wilson gave these historicist principles concrete
context when he canvassed 1500 years of European history to explain how constitutional
government evolved, see id. at 27-42, and when he interpreted 800 years ofAnglo-American
history to explain the emergence ofAmerican constitutional government. See id. at 2-3, 6-8.
241 See id. at 26.
242 Kesler, supra note 56, at 33.
243 ACKERMAN, supra note 18, at 36.
244 Id. at 48.
241 See id. at 268.
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246Woodrow Wilson's vision for reorganizing the federal government.
Whatever merits Ackerman's theory has as a historical and descriptive theory
of American constitutional development, it has no normative power except on the
Progressive premise that the people's will is constructive and binding. Further,
Progressive theory has one obvious advantage over Ackerman's: At least in
Progressive theory, the legislator or judge can rely on 800 years' worth of shared
Anglo-American or European experiences while trying to discern the People's
commands.247 If, as in Ackerman's theory, the people are always reconstructing
their political identity in no particular direction, it is virtually impossible to know
what the people decree to be their "higher law," separate from the "ordinary law."
I have focused on Ackerman's theory here because it is widely respected and
influential, but the same could be said of many other prevailing theories 'of
constitutional interpretation. Some might prefer David Strauss' theory of common
law constitutional interpretation because it offers the prospect of gradual Burkean
evolution, not the violent revolutionary spasms of Ackerman's constitutional
moments.24 But because Strauss starts from the premise that judges should interpret
constitutional doctrines to keep up with changing societal moral intuitions, he places
a great deal of faith in judges' ability to discern which intuitions prescribe the moral
and constitutional standards in their day.249 Others, like Mark Tushnet, might scoff
at judicial interpretation and argue that the Constitution should be interpreted
populist-style by representatives whose job it is to help us "start telling a different
story about ourselves precisely because we constitute ourselves ... can, in short,
change who we are."25 But Tushnet's project places a great deal of faith in those
representatives' capacity to know how we want to reconstitute ourselves.25' If one
prefers popular constitutionalism to Tushnet's populist constitutionalism, one can
follow Larry Kramer and argue that constitutionalism must accommodate
"processes, formal and informal, by which our constitutional understandings and
246 See supra text accompanying notes 9 1-100.
247 See CROLY, supra note 61, at 215-64 (interpreting the course of European history to
show the development of the concept of the centralized nation-state); WILSON, supra note
55, at 6-13 (interpreting the course ofAnglo-American history from the time ofMagna Carta
to 1910).
248 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877,893 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law] (advancing "familiar ideas perhaps most
commonly associated with Burke"); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional
Amendments, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1457, 1457 (2001) ("American constitutional law is best
seen as the result of a complex, evolutionary process.... ").
249 See Strauss, Common Law, supra note 248, at 900-02, 905-06, 918-19, 924.
250 TusHNET, supra note 211, at 191.
25 On this point, see Hadley Arkes, Lincoln, Nietzsche, and the Constitution, FIRST
THINGS, Apr. 2000, at 16 (criticizing Tushnet for his post-modernism and for interpreting the
Declaration contrary to its obvious meaning as an expression of political truths following
from "the Laws of Nature and Nature's God").
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commitments can be challenged, reinterpreted, and renewed." '252 But to say so is to
beg huge substantive questions about why and how "popular constitutionalism" and
institutional processes have any meaning that can impose normatively binding
constitutional commitments.
In any event, these sorts of interpretive problems beset Progressive
constitutional interpretation generally, and they would beset any attempt to invoke
living Commerce Clause arguments now. Herbert Croly and Woodrow Wilson's
interpretations of American history were one-sided and shallow. The United States
became more united over the course of the nineteenth century, yet at the end of this
period, court opinions and political speeches made clear that state regulation should
be the rule and federal regulation the exception, reserved for truly national objects
like stopping state protection wars or eradicating organized racial discrimination by
states.253 On the same basis, there are good reasons to wonder how much the
American people really "wanted" the New Deal expansion of national
government - at least in any way that could establish a normative basis for
replacing the constitutional presumption of limited and enumerated national
powers" 4 with a presumption of unlimited and general national powers. To be sure,
the American electorate supported the New Deal,255 and even now, the American
people support many new federal regulatory initiatives. At the same time, for at
least a generation, voters have seemed skeptical about federal regulation generally.
Ever since the Great Society and Watergate, presidential candidates including
Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush have had much
more success "running against Washington" than they have running with
Washington.256 When President Clinton proposed an ambitious new national system
252 Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (2001).
253 See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20-26 (1888) ("There must be a point of time
when [the goods] cease to be governed exclusively by the domestic [state] law and begin to
be governed and protected by the national law of commercial regulation. . . ."); The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-18 (1887) (Stating that the Fourteenth Amendment "nullifies
and makes void all state legislation, and state action of every kind, which impairs the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. .. ").
254 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (setting forth the powers of Congress); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) ("the Constitution creates a Federal Government of
enumerated powers.").
25 See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 494 (1999) (listing Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's overwhelming popular and electoral-vote totals in his campaigns for the
Presidency); id. at 90 (listing party makeup of the U.S. House and Senate during the 1930s).
Barry Cushman has canvassed public opinion polls during the New Deal in Mr. Dooley and
Mr. Gallup: Public Opinion and Constitutional Change in the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7
(2002).
256 See, e.g., MoRRis FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON
ESTABLISHMENT 1 (1977) ("In the 1976 campaign, Carter and Reagan "asked us to believe
that the seat of national government is (choose): (a) immobile, (b) corrupt, (c) dangerously
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of health-care regulation, he handed control of Congress to the Republican Party for
the first time in forty years.257 Reasonable minds can disagree about which of these
two views captures the American "state of mind." In either case, there is probably
no principled way to build a constitutional mandate on the answer.
Finally, these interpretive problems are especially severe as they relate to the
Commerce Clause, because they convert that Clause into a one-way ticket for
uniform national government. By way of contrast, in living Constitution terms, a
people's ideas about privacy can evolve and grow in any direction. The people may
fundamentally desire property in one century but sexual autonomy in another. Not
so when it comes to federalism. If the Constitution's meaning on federalism
emanates from the changing will of one, unified American people, the inquiry is
over before it even begins. This fact is obvious in the political thought of thinkers
like Wilson and Croly. They posited that American people acted parochially when
they chose to keep regulation in their backyards but maturely and historically when
they chose to expand the scope of their common national interests. These sorts of
distinctions create huge prejudices for preferring federal regulation over state
regulation without any obvious basis in principle or fact.
I do not know which of these two alternatives critics of Lopez and Morrison will
choose, but a choice must be made fairly soon. Laws like the Gun-Free School
Zones Act and the civil-liability provisions of the Violence Against Women Act
have pushed the case law to a point where either Article I or the cumulative-effects
rule has to go by the board. The Progressives' ideas about a living Commerce
Clause probably offer the best-developed argument in the American constitutional
tradition to wipe out Article I.
VII. THE LIVING COMMERCE CLAUSE IN AMERICAN POLITICS TODAY
A. Can Stare Decisis Support the Rational Basis Test?
On the other side, the Justices who want to protect the core of the New Deal but
use Article I to set some outer limits on the Commerce Clause also have some
explaining to do. In Lopez, the Court opinion... and Justice Kennedy's concurrence
both resolved not to disturb any of the Court's Commerce Clause precedent from
1937 up through Lopez, out of respect for stare decisis. Justice Kennedy was
particularly emphatic on this point: "Stare decisis operates with great force in
out of touch, (d) all of the above.").
257 See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 90 (1999) (listing party makeup of
the U.S. House and Senate during the 1990s); E.J. Dionne Jr., Op-Ed, Tied Score on Health
Care, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1996, at A2 1, (attributing the Republican victory in the house
to President Clinton's attempt at health-care reform).
251 See supra note 169-77 and accompanying text.
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counseling us not to call in question the essential principles now in place respecting
the congressional power to regulate transactions of a commercial nature.
259
These stare decisis claims are much more controversial than the Chief Justice
and Justice Kennedy made them seem. Stare decisis arguments smuggle in through
the backdoor political considerations about how well an established constitutional
rule is working and how much a new rule might improve things. That assessment
has not really taken place yet as to the rational basis test, even though other authors
have noted important problems in the arguments for that test. One of the main
justifications for the rational basis test was always a doctrinal criticism that pre-New
Deal Commerce Clause case law was "formal," brittle, arbitrary, and perhaps even
opportunistic." 0 But Barry Cushman has shown convincingly why this body of
Commerce Clause law made much more sense on its own terms than we tend to
assume now.26' Richard Epstein has explained why in principle it is no more or less
difficult to enforce the pre-New Deal understanding of the Commerce Clause than
it is to enforce several kinds of laws federal courts apply routinely, especially the
dormant Commerce Clause and international-trade agreements.262 Separately,
Epstein and Michael Greve have also pointed out serious public-choice criticisms
with the rational basis test, which undermined a system of interstate regulatory
competition and replaced it with a system of organized rent-seeking by national
interest groups.263
But the Commerce Clause and the rational basis test also raise a third series of
stare decisis considerations. These considerations arise only when the Court is
reconsidering a constitutional doctrine so fundamental that it belongs not only in a
class on constitutional law but also in any class on constitutional government. One
can probably count such doctrines on the fingers of two hands: They surely include
Lochner, the debate over equality reflected in Dred Scott,2" Plessy v. Ferguson's
separate-but-equal doctrine265 and Brown v. Board of Education's color-blind
doctrine,266 and the debate over abortion reflected in Planned Parenthood v.
259 Id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
260 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Aspen 3d ed. 1996);
TRIBE, supra note 160, § 5-1, at 297.
261 See Cushman, supra note 36; Epstein, supra note 22 (discussing the significance of
pre-New Deal Commerce Clause interpretation).
262 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 22, at 1454; Richard A. Epstein, ConstitutionalFaith and
the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 167, 190 (1996) [hereinafter Epstein,
Constitutional Faith].
263 See MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, How IT COULD
HAPPEN 2-3, 79-82 (1999); Epstein, Constitutional Faith, supra note 262, at 190-91
(favoring pre-new Deal state regulatory competition); Epstein, supra note 22, at 1451-54.
264 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (14 How.) 393 (1856).
265 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
266 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Casey.267 As Justice Kennedy himself recognized in Casey, when the Court
considers the viability of doctrines so fundamental, the Court cannot decide whether
to continue to apply stare decisis without taking stock of how society has accepted
the doctrine and how it understands the facts and norms on which the doctrine is
based.2
68
The Commerce Clause surely counts as one of those fundamental doctrines. We
may forget it now because Commerce Clause doctrine has been technical and
economic ever since Wickard. But the doctrine seems dry and boring only because
the Progressives and President Franklin Roosevelt succeeded in working a thorough
transformation of the federal government's regulatory powers. That constitutional
transformation could not have come about without a series of strong political
commitments. Anyone who is inclined to doubt this claim need only consider the
extraordinary hostility Lopez and Morrison have generated. Those political
commitments are bound to have a huge impact on our current political and
regulatory practice. Before the members of the Lopez majority can use stare decisis
as a ground for declining to reconsider the rational basis test, they must make a
considered and honest assessment about how well the political commitments this
test symbolizes have contributed to our system of government. The dissenters must
take the same lessons under advisement when they follow Larry Kramer's "political
safeguards" theory, which claims that state governments protect their interests by
negotiating with federal bureaucracies.2 69 The political safeguards theory breaks
down if state governments and federal bureaucracies are following conceptions of
state and national interests mapped out by progressives like Wilson, Croly, and
Goodnow.27°
B. The Living Commerce Clause in Contemporary Political Practice
Here, living Commerce Clause principles describe the character of modem
regulatory and political practice far better than the standard process and economics-
based explanations for the rational basis test. If Epstein and Greve have described
how post-New Deal federalism encourages regulatory "bootlegging" by national
special interests, Progressive political ideas capture the tendencies of the idealistic
"Baptists" who have done much of the regulating since the New Deal.271 Every
267 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
268 See id. at 861-69 (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
269 See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back in to the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215,283 (2000); Larry D. Kramer, But When Exactly Was
Judicially-Enforced Federalism "Born" in the First Place?, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
123, 136 (1999); Larry D. Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 VAND.L.REv. 1485, 1543
(1994).
270 See supra text accompanying notes 49-120.
271 See, e.g., BRUCE YANDLE, THE POLITICAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:
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constitutional order has what Bruce Ackerman calls "regime principles," '272 the
common opinions held throughout a society that set that society's aspirations and
goals. The rational basis test does not articulate any such principles. It is not a
blueprint for political action, but rather a judge-made excuse for judicial inaction.
The Progressives' arguments about federalism, by contrast, articulate the New
Deal's regime principles for federalism. To illustrate, the Justices of the Supreme
Court in Morrison spent all of their energies arguing whether the tort provisions of
the Violence Against Women Act increase the productivity of women in the
American workforce and whether the answer to this empirical question makes any
constitutional difference.273 Surely congressmen did not trouble themselves with
such questions when they voted on the Act; they made a political judgment about
whether "[a]ll persons within the United States" should have "the right to be free
from crimes of violence motivated by gender," and whether the federal government
should guarantee that right.274
These nationalism and federalism regime principles capture many of these ideas
in our political practice today. First, these themes anticipate the tendency of many
federal laws to make grand symbolic promises, like the claim that the Violence
Against Women Act would eradicate gender-motivated violence. In living
Constitution theory, enterprising national elites and forceful presidents catalyze the
political process when they present the American people with competing political
visions.275 When the people subscribe to one vision over another, they automatically
create a new set of common national interests. Because these visions are broad,
Congress codifies them in broad, thematic strokes. Federal bureaucrats do the detail
work, deciding how best how to write the people's declared will into regulation.
TRACKING THE UNICORN 23-25 (1989); R. Shep Melnick, Strange Bedfellows Make Normal
Politics: An Essay, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 75, 79 (1998).
272 ACKERMAN, supra note 18; Tushnet, New Constitutional Order, supra note 18, at 29,
31.
273 Compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614-15 (2000) ("But the existence
of congressional findings [of the impact of gender-motivated violence] is not sufficient, by
itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation."), with id. at 629-35
& nn. 3-7 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he legislative record [supporting the VAWA]... is
far more voluminous than the record compiled by Congress and found sufficient in two prior
cases upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Commerce Clause
challenges."), and id. at 662 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[A]s Justice Souter has pointed out,
Congress compiled a 'mountain of data' explicitly documenting the interstate commercial
effects of gender-motivated crimes of violence.").
274 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(b) (2000).
275 See WILSON, supra note 55, at 65 (describing a good president as "a man who
understands his own day and the needs of the country, and who has the personality and the
initiative to enforce his views both upon the people and upon Congress"); Woodrow Wilson,
Leaders of Men, Commencement Address at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (June
17, 1890), in 6 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 646 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1969).
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These symbol-heavy laws tend to be implemented in ways that manifest a strong
hostility toward state and local government. State or local government is often
preferable when local agencies are better informed about local conditions and the
opinions of the local populace who have to live under the law.276 In Progressive
political thought, these kinds of concerns do not count. If federal officials are
convinced they are helping promote the next new national solution, state and local
governments are most likely part of the problem. Writers like Woodrow Wilson and
Herbert Croly claimed to conserve state institutions, but they also went to
considerable lengths to make such institutions seem parochial277 and corrupt.27
These critical tendencies in their writings accord with the basic presuppositions of
their thought much more than their conservative tendencies. Because the American
people act progressively when they act as one people, state government's first
tendency is to atomize the people and impede their historical evolution. Thus,
Woodrow Wilson can warn that any "conflict of laws in matters which vitally
interest the whole country" constitutes a great "political danger." '279
The last and perhaps most extreme tendency is toward immoderation in national
political goals. Because the people are always setting new federal goals for
themselves, they cannot have any long-term federal priorities. There is no sense that
the federal government is institutionally better-equipped to handle a few enormous
problems, like the common defense and interstate trade, or that the federal
government becomes less effective as it assumes more responsibility. Instead, in
Woodrow Wilson's words, there is only a confidence that the federal government
must "take cognizance and attempt to control" an ever-expanding list of objects that
jointly concern the American people." For Wilson, the national statesman's virtues
do not include moderation or prudence. All of the Progressive political virtues are
oriented toward action: "initiative," "look[ing] forward, not backward," and "a
slowly progressive modification and transfer of functions as between the States and
the federal government.""28 As Wilson says elsewhere, "the transgression of the law
of political progress" is "[p]olitical [s]in.1282
276 Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001).
277 See WILSON, supra note 55, at 44-45 (criticizing the states at the Founding for being
havens for "the jealous politicians of the self-conscious little commonwealths").
278 See id. at 189-90 ("The truth is that our state governments are, many of them, no
longer truly representative governments.").
279 Id. at 186.
280 Id. at 195.
281 Id. at 193-94.
282 Woodrow Wilson, An Outline of and Memoranda for "The Philosophy of Politics" (c.
Jan. 26, 1895), in 9 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 275, at 129; see also
Kesler, supra note 50, at 120 (discussing Wilson's belief that the statesman's role is "'to
point out the way of progress').
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C. Illustrations: Guns in Schools, Violence Against Women, and Arsenic in Water
These themes cannot capture every facet of post-New Deal federal commercial
regulation in all its varieties, but they are familiar, and they have an effect on
modern-day federal regulation. The Gun-Free School Zones Act certainly seems to
loom larger for its political symbolism content than its substantive content. Even
if the U.S. Department of Justice tried to prosecute offenses against the Gun-Free
School Zones Act on a consistent basis, it simply would not have the resources to
prosecute them as consistently as state and local authorities can. The same can be
said of the civil remedy provisions of the Violenoe Against Women Act (VAWA),
which declared a federal "right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender" anywhere in the United States." 3 Federal courts cannot vindicate a federal
right against gender-related battery effectively: There are almost twice as many trial
judges in California alone as there are Article 11 federal judges throughout the entire
United States. 4 Nor was there any obvious evidence that Congress created this
remedy because it was dissatisfied with the way state and local courts were applying
state law to gender-motivated torts. To guarantee women their newfound rights,
VAWA's cause of action created an undefined "action for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages."" 5 Congress did not single out any specific
defects in state battery law; it simply declared an open-ended right and left the
federal courts to declare what the right means.
The Gun-Free School Zones Act and VAWA's civil action probably had fairly
minor effects on the federal-state balance,' but this penchant for national political
symbolism can have a huge substantive impact when it influences federal
administrative regulation. In environmental law and policy, for instance, the
prevailing conventional wisdom holds that states are either too incompetent or too
corrupt to make sound environmental policy. Richard Revesz has criticized this
view extensively in his scholarship,286 but he has had little success because he is
going against powerful political assumptions that shape environmental policy. To
take just one recent example, in 2001 the Bush Administration and leading members
of Congress debated whether the Environmental Protection Agency should lower the
federal arsenic standard for drinking water from fifty to ten parts per billion (ppb).
President Bush was criticized roundly for suggesting that this topic might be better
left to state regulation, and eventually his Administration backed down. But Bush's
283 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (2001).
284 There are 1499 judges in California's Superior Courts. See CAL. ADMIN. OFFICES OF
THE COURTS, FACT SHEET: CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2002), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/cajudsys.pdf. There are 821 Article III
judges in the federal court system. See The 'Lectric Law Library, Understanding the Federal
Courts, at http://www.lectlaw.com/files/jud2 l.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
285 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(c) (2000).
286 See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 276.
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first instincts were probably right. Well water is not a migratory resource. Local
residents will reap both the costs and the benefits of whatever arsenic standard they
apply. The EPA rule claims to protect Americans from bladder and lung cancer
caused by trace amounts of arsenic, but no cases of arsenic-related cancer have ever
been reported in the United States." 7 In addition, because the EPA relied heavily on
extrapolations from cancer studies in Taiwan, reasonable minds could disagree
about how much credence to give the EPA's extrapolations. 8 In addition the ten
ppb standard is going to be expensive to comply with in many areas, especially in
mountain states, 289 where bladder and lung cancer rates are significantly lower than
national averages anyway." Strictly at the level of policy, unless local water
districts are corrupt or incompetent, why entangle the EPA in thousands of local
water safety cost-benefit analyses, and why not leave it to local officials to
determine how much safety local residents are willing to pay for?
The regulatory process and the political process, however, exhibited powerful
preferences for exactly the opposite substantive result. The Safe Drinking Water.
Act,29 1 which the EPA administered, claims that Congress has a national interest in
water safety: Congress enacted it "to assure that water supply systems serving the
public meet minimum national standards for protection of public health. 292 To
further this intent, the Act makes an ambitious commitment to eradicate drinking
water contamination. The Act instructs the EPA to set maximum contaminant goals,
the levels of contamination at which "no known or anticipated adverse effects on the
health of persons occur." '293 In practice, the EPA usually sets these goals at zero.29a
287 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, No. EPA/625/3-87/013, SPECIAL REPORT ON
INGESTED INORGANIC ARSENIC SKIN CANCER: NUTRITIONAL ESSENTIALITY 21 (1988).
28 See Denise Riedel Lewis et al., Drinking Water Arsenic in Utah: A Cohort Mortality
Study, 107 ENVTL HEALTH PERSP. 359,363-64 & nn. 9, 32, 33, 35 (1999); Sue E. Umshler,
Comment, When Arsenic is Safer in Your Cup of Tea Than in Your Local Water Treatment
Plant, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J., 565, 589-92 (1999).
289 To comply with the new rule, public water users in states like New Mexico and Utah
stand to face water bill increases of $300 or more to comply with the new rule, increases ten
times as high as those urban users stand to face. National Primary Drinking Water
Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, at 7010-11 (Jan. 22, 2001).
290 Utah and New Mexico, two of the states most likely to be hardest hit by the new rule,
have lung cancer rates of 35.9 and 51.7 incidents per 100,000 males, respectively, as
compared to a national average of 73.7 per 100,000 males. They have bladder cancer rates
of22.6 and 20.7 incidents per 100,000 males, respectively, as compared to a national average
of 28.7. AM. CANCER SOC., CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2001, at 8 (2001), available at
http://www.cancer.org/downloads/STr/F&F200 1.pdf.
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2000).
292 See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1185, at I (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6454, 6454.
293 See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4)(A).
294 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE ARITHMETIC OF ARSENIC 16 (John M. Olin Program in
Law and Econ., Univ. of Chicago Law Sch., Working Paper No. 135, 2001) (explaining that
the maximum contaminant goals in this scheme are usually supposed to be zero).
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The Act then charges the EPA to issue regulations setting a water-contaminant
standard for each contaminant that comes "as close to the maximum contaminant
level goal as is feasible."295 This is an organic statute that reflects an ambitious
symbolic commitment to stamp out a national problem.
If the basic drift of the Safe Water Drinking Act left any doubt about the likely
result of the arsenic debate, public debate eliminated it. It was simply not
respectable in political debate to suggest that drinking water standards could be left
to local regulation. As one journalist put it to Christine Whitman, former New
Jersey governor and current EPA Secretary, every state had to have as safe a water,
standard as every other: "Why should people in New Jersey have safer drinking
water than the rest of the country?" 296 Supporters of a national standard also
attacked the motives of anyone who touted a local solution. When Governor
Whitman resisted the thrust of the question above, the interviewer suggested that she
was giving "the impression ... that you were gotten to by the mining industry,"
which is influential throughout western states.297
D. The Living Commerce Clause as a Proxyfor the Character ofFederal Regulation
These sentiments are not the only forces influencing post-New Deal federal
commercial regulation, but they are quite familiar and consistent. As they influence
a wide range of national political and regulatory practice, there are good reasons for
wondering whether they have corroded the quality of those practices. Political
scientists like John Marini have noted that as the federal regulatory bureaucracy has
grown since the New Deal, it "has become more autonomous and less responsive to
the political order as a whole."'2 9 The sheer size of this system has overwhelmed the
executive branch's powers to supervise the administration of the law.2 99 Members
of Congress have relinquished their responsibility for making general laws, assumed
responsibility for overseeing administrative agencies through the committee process,
and learned to reap the political benefits that come from playing "good cops" for
constituents threatened by "bad cop" agencies."° Within this expanded system,
Marini concludes, "Congress prefers to attend to the details of administration in
support of the local, often parochial, interests" of constituencies far narrower than
295 42 U.S.C. § 300g-I(b)(4)(B).
296 Meet the Press: EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman Discusses Bush
Administration Environmental Policies (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 22,2001), LEXIS,
News Library, Script File.
297 Id.
298 MARINI, supra note 50, at 194.
299 Id. at 194-98.
'oo Morris P. Fiorina, Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy: A Mismatch of
Incentives and Capabilities, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 332 (Laurence C. Dodd & Bruce
I. Oppenheimer eds., 1981).
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the interests of a national majority."'
It is worth wondering at this point whether the early view of the Commerce
Clause generated a more decent program for politics and regulation than the vision
we live under today. The authors of decisions like Gibbons and Kidd sought to limit
the national government both to keep it vigorous in the fields in which it is most
competent and to preserve individuals' control over the laws that affected them the
most. From their perspective, the rational basis test seems perverse. The nationalist
political vision that the rational basis test sanctions contributes to a style of politics
and regulation in which federal legislators cannot distinguish between national
priorities and local retail politics.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional law and constitutional politics have a complicated relationship.
Massive political changes surely bring about legal changes. New ruling political
principles influence and guide the ways in which public lawyers recast old
precedents to bring about new political results. Still, the law never completely
follows politics. The law has its own institutional needs in the long and slow
periods between periods of political ferment. Because the legal system depends on
stability, it needs at least the appearance that there is a seamless continuity between
the legal commands of the Constitution and the political principles that prevail
today.
This tension has influenced Commerce Clause legal doctrine ever since the New
Deal. Progressive and New Deal political reformers hoped to establish a new
system of government built around a vigorous administrative state run by a national
government of general and unlimited powers. Most of all, they wanted to establish
a point of principle, that the national government could tackle anything the
American people thought a national problem. They accomplished most of what they
wanted during the New Deal, but not the point of principle. Instead of a living
Commerce Clause, New Deal lawyers won for them the rational basis test. For
almost sixty years after the New Deal, this test produced the same substantive results
as a living Commerce Clause, but there was always a tension in principle between
the two.
I doubt that there will be a serious reexamination of the political merits of the
Commerce Clause at any time in the foreseeable future. Politics and constitutional
law both strongly need authority, and the rational basis test supplies legal authority
for a political practice that is otherwise hard to square with Article I of the
Constitution. Nevertheless, if that reexamination should ever occur, the political
ideas examined in this Article point the way. On one side, critics must choose either
to tone down their criticism of Lopez and Morrison, or to repudiate their
301 MARINI, supra note 50, at 199.
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commitment to Article I and shift to a living Commerce Clause critique. On the
other side, Lopez and Morrison supporters must ask themselves how long they can
advocate incremental limits on the scope of the Commerce Clause without seriously
examining the political assumptions that drove the expansion of that Clause through
the New Deal and beyond.
